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Transportation Regulation and Innovation:

The Dial-A-Bus*
J. Michael Hines** and David W. Sloan***
I. INTRODUCTION

There is today a growing recognition that inadequate public
transportation contributes significantly to a broad variety of
metropolitan-urban problems.

Although dispersal of economic

and social activities throughout the metropolitan area has made
access to an automobile a prerequisite to good employment, economic and social mobility and the enjoyment of public and private services and amenities, a significant portion of the population, including the poor, the old, the young and the housewife,
do not generally have such access. Concomitant to dependence
upon the automobile is an increase in pollution and congestion.
In the face of this growing crisis, public transportation service and ridership is declining while the costs are increasing. The
technology of public transportation has remained constant for
over 50 years, comprising flexibly routed but expensive taxicabs
and fixed-route buses and rail.cars. This static industry is constrained by a rigid and confusing regulatory system. The result
is a lack of any significant reponse to changing consumer needs
and an absence of innovation in technology, management and
service.
Public awareness of American transportation problems has
led to certain positive responses, including congressional measures to provide assistance and funds for research and development and state and local creation of Departments of Transportation and Metropolitan Transit Authorities.
A specific example is research and development on the Diala-Bus (DAB) systen. This system, which has many manifestations, aims to fill the gap between fixed-route bus transportation
and taxis. The concept envisions a fleet of small vehicles, centrally controlled, which can be dispatched along any and all local
streets in response to telephoned service requests. The vehicles
* This article results from research done by the authors for the
CARS project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1969 and
1970.
**
Associate, Dow, Lohnes &Albertson, Washington, D.C.
* **
Associate, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, Calif.
Member of the California Bar.
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would be routed so as to pick up and deposit passengers at the
exact locations they desire.
In its most sophisticated version, DAB would have a large
fleet, monitored by a computer and radio communications system
as well as location sensors throughout the area in such a way that
the vehicles would be dynamically rerouted along optimum
routes as service requests were telephoned to the computer. Its
most limited version would involve one small vehicle manually
routed by a central dispatcher. The system could meet demands
for travel from one origin to many destinations, many origins to
one destination or many origins to many destinations. It is
hoped that it would serve travel needs in a low-density residential area, provide service between the radial arms of a public
transit system, serve as a feeder service to line-haul rail and bus
transit and meet a variety of other local and neighborhood needs.
The United States Department of Transportation has funded research and development into this concept and is presently supporting its demonstration in New Jersey.'
Using the DAB as an example, this article examines federal
and state regulatory systems and their impact upon innovative
public transportation services. Section II investigates existing
systems of regulatory classification and exemption. In discussing
the federal system, the classification of regulated carriers and the
exemptions available to carriers of passengers are analyzed. Special emphasis is given to services which might be provided by
DAB. In addition, the section surveys the approaches toward
classification and exemption adopted by state regulatory legislation. The relationship of DAB to these statutes is considered.
Finally, the need for consumer-oriented innovation in public
transportation and the inadequacy of present institutional and
regulatory structures are described. An "experimental exemption" from regulation is proposed to encourage the testing and
implementation of new technological and service concepts.
Section III assumes that DAB would not qualify for any exemption from regulation, thus focusing on the problem of acquiring permission to operate. This section is essentially advocacy,
anticipating some of the obstacles a DAB application would meet
at state law and marshalling arguments and authorities to overcome them. Finally, the article considers the developing federal
law as it would affect a DAB. While it would be very unlikely
that a DAB would attempt to operate solely in interstate com1.
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merce, federal law can provide persuasive analogies since it is
more fully developed through litigation, much state law is patterned after it and, most importantly, operations similar to DAB
have recently been considered by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the federal courts.
II.

SYSTEMS OF CLASSIFICATION AND EXEMPTION

A. THE FEDERAL SYsTEm
The federal regulatory system is important in its direct applicability to the DAB or any other innovative service implemented in an interstate metropolitan area. It is also important
in that it serves as a model for much state transportation law.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (hereinafter referred to as MCA),
as amended, 2 governs the operation of motor carriers of both
passengers and property and lodges the responsibility for their
regulation with the ICC. 3
1.

Definition of "Interstate"

To determine whether a given service is covered by federal
law, it must first be established that it is "interstate" within the
meaning of the MCA. According to 49 U.S.C. § 303 (a) (10),
"The term 'interstate commerce' means commerce between any
place in a State and any place in another State or between places
in the same State through another State, whether such commerce moves wholly by motor vehicle or partly by motor vehicle
."
The usual federal practice is to develop rules and standards for passenger carriers by analogy from those governing carriers of goods. However, the two types of carrier are treated
somewhat differently in defining "interstate commerce."
The interstate status of a carrier of property derives from the
"essential character of the movement" in which it is participating.4 The primary determinant of this character is the "fixed
and persisting transportation intent of the shipper at time of
shipment," which will control unless there is a significant interruption in the continuity of movement of the goods. 5 The partici2. 49 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq. (1964).
3. Id. § 302(a).
4. Baltimore & 0. S.W. R.R. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166, 170 (1922).
5. See J. GUANDOLO, TRANsPoarATIoN LAw 651 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as GuANnOLO] (emphasis added). See also Atlantic Coast Line PR.
v. Standard Oil Co., 275 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1927); North Carolina Util.
Comnm'n v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 930, 933-34 (E.D.N.C. 1966);
Leamington Transp. Ltd., Common Carrier Application, 81 M.C.C. 695,
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pation of several different carriers and modes in a given shipment of goods is not sufficient to disturb the continuity of movement requisite for ICC jurisdiction."
It is usually immaterial whether a carrier's vehicles actually
cross state lines. 7 Certain cases of local delivery service, however, where there was no common control of the goods throughout the entire interstate trip, have been held to be beyond the
reach of the ICC.8 An illogical or bad-faith routing between
points in one state through a second state will not succeed as a
subterfuge to avoid state regulationY
Passenger carriers are subject to a narrower definition of
interstate than the above definition for property carriers. The
intention of a carrier's passengers to "ship" themselves out-ofstate usually does not characterize it as "interstate." In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Allen, 10 ad hoc and charter groups were
carried along routes completely within California to towns straddling the Nevada border. The admitted destinations of virtually
all passengers were Nevada gambling casinos in the towns, to
which passengers generally walked. The ICC found the carrier
to be beyond its jurisdiction stating:
[T]he Commission has consistently held that regardless of the intention of any passenger to continue or complete an interstate
journey, a carrier of passengers operating wholly within a single
State, selling no through tickets, and having no common arrangements with connecting out-of-State carriers, is not engaged
in transportation in interstate or foreign commerce.11
The Supreme Court has not gone so far as the Commission
in limiting the definition of interstate passenger carriage. United
699 (1959) (the service is not to be tested mechanically, but the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the transportation must be weighed).
6.

Dallum v. Farmers' Co-operative Trucking Ass'n, 46 F. Supp.

785, 788 (D. Minn. 1942). See also State Corp. Comm'n v. Bartlett &
Co., 338 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965) (the
temporary storage of grain prior to out-of-state shipment does not break
the continuity of movement from the original shipping point); Great N.
Ry. v. Thompson, 222 F. Supp. 573 (D. N.D. 1963) (transfer of goods from

a railroad's cars to its trucks does not disrupt continuity of movement).
7. See, e.g., Earle v. Brink's, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 676, 678 (S.D.N.Y.
1943).

8. See, e.g., Borough Express, Inc. v. Schoenbaum & Hermelin

Express, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 959, 260 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1965); Roseweb Frocks,

Inc. v. Rose, 52 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1945).
9. See Leonard Express, Inc. v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 556
(W.D. Pa. 1969); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Hudson Transp. Co.,
88 M.C.C. 745 (1962), aff'd, 219 F. Supp. 43 (D. N.J. 1963).

10. 99 M.C.C. 1 (1965). See also Midwest Transp., Inc., Common
Carrier Application, 98 M.C.C. 362 (1965); Moore Service, Inc., Extension,
89 M.C.C. 180 (1962).

11.

99 M.C.C. at 4 (1965).
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States v. Yellow Cab Co.' 2 involved the taxicab carriage of passengers from their homes to interstate rail terminals. The Court
stated that the limits of a particular kind of commerce must be
set by practical considerations and that the movements involved
3
here were not "an integral part of interstate transportation."'
Using this "integral part" test, the Court has found that an intraDistrict of Columbia carrier, whose clientele was comprised
largely of Virginia commuters, was within the ICC's jurisdiction.14 However, there appear to be no cases in which the Supreme Court has considered the Commission's view as expressed
in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Allen. The Supreme Court cases are
older and the Allen analysis has controlled many situations and
can probably be relied upon by a DAB operator.
2. State-FederalJurisdictionalProblems
Congress has not exhausted its constitutional power to regulate motor carriers in interstate commerce. The MCA states,
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the powers
of taxation of the several States or to authorize a motor carrier
to do an intrastate business ... ."1 A state may tax carriers as
compensation for the use of its highways, enforce vehicle safety
regulations and registration provisions and require licensing of
drivers.16 The federal courts, however, have construed the MCA
broadly to reach all those who are "in substance" engaged in in17
terstate transportation for hire.
State officers may not interpret the conditions of an ICC operating authority or attempt to modify its regulatory terms.' 8
Nor may a state refuse a federally-certificated carrier permission
to conduct its operations on its roads.1 9 Finally, if a carrier has
both intra- and interstate activities, it will be fully subject to
20
state regulation to the extent of its intrastate operations.
12. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
13. Id. at 230-33.
14. United States v. Capital Transit Co., 338 U.S. 286 (1949).
15. 49 U.S.C. § 302(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
16. See, e.g., Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952); Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); People v. Learnard, 305 N.Y. 495, 114
N.E.2d 9 (1953).
17. See, e.g., ICC v. Interstate Auto Shippers, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); ICC v. Dudgeon, 213 F. Supp. 710, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1961),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 960 (1963).
18. Andrew G. Nelson, Inc. v. Jessup, 134 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ind.
1955).
19. See, e.g., Ex parte Truelock, 139 Tex. Crim. 365, 140 S.W.2d 167
(Ct. Crim. App. 1940).
20. Eichholz v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 268, 273 (1939); Leonard
Express, Inc. v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
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Classificationof Regulated Carriers

a. Compensation. The MCA subjects all carriers to the regulation of hours and safety. 2 1 In addition, it creates two categories of carriers, "common" and "contract," which must also submit
to economic regulation. Once a carrier has been characterized as
"interstate," the classification into which it falls must be determined. These classifications are defined as follows:
The term "common carrier by motor vehicle" means any
person which holds itself out to the general public to engage in
the transportation by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce of passengers or property ... for compensation, whether
over regular or irregular routes ....
The term "contract carrier by motor vehicle" means any person
which engages in transportation by motor vehicle of passengers
or property in interstate .. .commerce, for compensation ...
under continuing contracts with one person or a limited number
of persons .... 22

A threshold question is whether "compensation" is present.2 '
This does not require an element of profit but only the reimbursement of expenses. 24 Services which have been found to be "for
compensation" include a non-profit shippers' association2 5 and
an auto drive-away service in which a broker brought together
drivers and car owners for a fee. 26 Compensation also may include benefits such as the saving of a license fee2 7 or the ability
to utilize idle equipment. 28 Thus it appears that any exchange
of value, although indirect, will bring a carrier within one of
these two classes.
b. Common Carriers. A common carrier is characterized
by a "holding out" of its services indiscriminately to the general
21. 49U.S.C. § 304(a) (1) (1964).
22. Id. § 303(a) (14), (15). Section 15 goes on to state that the
required contracts shall be either:
(a) for the furnishing of transportation services through the assignment of motor vehicles for a continuing period of time to
the exclusive use of each person served or (b) for the furnishing
of transportation services designed to meet the distinct need
of each individual customer.
23. Id. § 303(c).
24. Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 981,
987-88 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd, 326 U.S. 432 (1946).
25. Shippers Cooperative, Inc. v. ICC, 308 F.2d 888, 892 (9th Cir.
1962); ICC v. International Shippers Ass'n of New Jersey, Inc., 249 F.
Supp. 66, 69 (D. N.J. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 363 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1966).
26. Orleman v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 945, 946-47 (E.D. Mich.
1963).
27. Pitchenik and Kramer, Contract Carrier Application, 34 M.C.C.
353, 355 (1942).
28. Monarch Associates, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 107
M.C.C. 277 (1968).
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public or to a class thereof.L2 9 Common carriers must receive a
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the ICC before they may commence operations. They are subject to detailed economic regulation, may not discontinue service without
Commission approval and have a duty to serve all who come forward with a reasonable demand for service. 30 In return, however, common carriers are protected from competition by the
certification process.
The class of common carriers, in addition to regularly scheduled bus lines and taxicabs, has been held to include charter
party service and tour buses, 31 a drive-away service bringing together car owners and people willing to drive them to a specified
destination, 32 an agency which arranged groups for car pools and
then leased vehicles to them,3 3 limousine service,3 4 chauffeur
service 3 5 and door-to-door transportation of passengers and their
baggage in sedan-type vehicles, between a city and a resort, on a
nonscheduled basis over irregular routes.3 0 Flexible, irregular
route common carriers are defined by the ICC to be "special op'3 7
erations.
c. Contract Carriers. A contract carrier is one which operates under a limited number of contracts which delineate specialized services designed to meet the needs of each contractor.3 8
Such a carrier must obtain a permit from the ICC which involves
economic and service regulation" but does not require that the
carrier serve all comers. To qualify for a permit, an applicant
must show that his service involves not a public dedication of
29. 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (14) (1964).

See also Craig, Contract Carrier

Application, 31 M.C.C. 705 (1941); 13 C.J.S. Carriers§ 530 (1939).

30. See, e.g., Kauffman, Extension of Operations, 30 M.C.C. 517
(1941).
31. Fordham Bus Corp. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941).
32. ICC v. AAA Con Drivers Exch., Inc., 340 F.2d 820 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911 (1965).
33. Monarch Assoc., Inc., Common Carrier Application, 107 M.C.C.
277 (1968).
34. Tri-State Coach Lines, Inc., Common Carrier Application No.
MC 129038 (1969); Arrow Line, Inc. v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 608
(D. Conn. 1966).
35. Adams, Common Carrier Application, 94 M.C.C. 290 (1963).
36. Nudelman, Common Carrier Application, 22 M.C.C. 275 (1940),
reconsidered,28 MLC.C. 91 (1941).
37. See, e.g., Michaud Bus Lines Inc., Extension, 100 M.C.C. 432
(1966).
38. E.g., Costello v. Smith, 179 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1950); Pregler,
Extension of Operations, 23 M.C.C. 691, 694-95 (1940).
39. 49U.S.C. § 309 (1964).
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facilities but merely specialization to meet the distinct needs of a
40
limited number of individuals or groups.
The ICC has found that nonprofit shippers' associations, serving only their members, fall within this category. 41 It has, however, only rarely granted contract carrier permits to carriers of
passengers, finding as a rule, that they are common carriers. The
carriage of Mexican farm workers, 42 and, in some cases, the transportation of groups of employees to their work places, 43 have
been classified as contract carrier services.
4. Exemptions
a. Private Carrier. The MCA establishes the class of private carriers of property as follows:
The term "private carrier of property by motor vehicle" means
any person not included in the terms "common carrier by motor
vehicle" or "contract carrier by motor vehicle", who . . . transports in interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle property of which such person is the owner, lessee, or bailee, when
is ... in furtherance of any commercial ensuch transportation
44
terprise.
Such carriers, transporting their own goods incidental to a primary nontransportation business, are subject only to the safety
and hours regulation of section 304. This type of carriage comprises the fastest growing segment of the transportation industry.
Apparently the only case in which the Commission has
found a carrier of passengers to be "private" and outside the regulatory scope of the Act is Kratzenberg,45 in which the carrier
rented his car and his personal services as a chauffeur on a
month-to-month basis. Given this single case, and the ICC's
practice of requiring certificates for passenger carriers, it appears
that any carriage extending beyond the private needs of a family
will be within the regulatory boundaries of the Act. A carrier
can be freed from economic regulation only to the extent it can
comply with one of the specific exemptions described below.
b. Section 303(b), Exemptions. Section 303 (b) defines several specific exemptions from all the regulatory provisions of the
40. Craig, Contract Carrier Application, 31 M.C.C. 705 (1941).
41. Shippers Cooperative, Inc. v. ICC, 308 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1962).
42. Bracero Transp. Inc., 100 M.C.C. 359 (1966).
43. Alexandria, B. & W. Co., 78 M.C.C. 655 (1959); Columbia Park
Maintenance Club, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 49 M.C.C. 870
(1949).
44. 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (17) (1964).

45. 27 M.C.C. 141 (1940).
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Act except those of section 304. These cover vehicles used solely
for the transportation of school children and teachers, "taxicabs,
or other motor vehicles performing a bona fide taxicab service,
having a capacity of not more than six passengers and not operated on a regular route or between fixed termini," hotel vehicles
used exclusively as transportation for patrons of the hotel between hotels and local common carrier stations, vehicles used by
farmers to transport agricultural commodities and supplies, motor vehicles operated by a cooperative association as defined in
the Agricultural Marketing Act and vehicles used exclusively for
the transportation of livestock, fish and other designated commodities, the distribution of newspapers and transportation of
persons or property incidental to transportation by aircraft. In
addition, section 303 (b) (8)- (10) provides three further exemptions, unless the Commission finds that the national transportation policy requires that they be reduced or eliminated. These
exemptions are for transportation within a municipality and the
"commercial zone" adjacent to it, casual or occasional transportation for compensation by any person not engaged in transportation by motor vehicle as a regular occupation of business and
the emergency towing of disabled vehicles.
c. Taxicabs. This exemption encompasses any "bona fide
taxi service" which is not conducted over regular routes or between fixed termini. The ICC has stated that "taxicab service as
that term is generally understood is essentially a local service
....

Congress... intended to partially exempt only those op-

erations which are conducted within a municipality and its immediate environs ....

4

Thus transportation within 25 or 30

miles of a given municipality has been held to be within the exemption while trips of 75 miles and over have been found to be
47
charter service.

46. Whitman's Black & White Cab Co., Common Carrier Application, 47 M.C.C. 737, 741 (1948).
47. See Leonard, Common Carrier Application, 48 M.C.C. 852
(1948) (exemption for operations within 25 mile radius of base); Bisbee,
Common Carrier Application, 18 I.C.C. 175 (1939) (applicant operating
a taxi service between Fremont, Ind. and numerous points in Michigan
and Ohio, within 30 miles of Fremont, held to be exempt). Compare
D & M Taxi Co., Common Carrier Application, 96 M.C.C. 439, 446
(1964) (although distances involved were only 28 miles, ICC found that
the development of intervening communities placed Ft. Dix and McGuire
Air Force Base outside the "immediate environs" of Philadelphia);
Whitman's Black & White Cab Co., Common Carrier Application, 47
VLC.C. 737 (1948) (interstate taxi operations originating in Birmingham,
Ala., over routes longer than 75 miles, held nonexempt).
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The words "bona fide" are used to distinguish taxi operations
from charter and special operations conducted in small vehicles.'"
Thus the carriage of athletic teams in taxi vehicles 49 and limousine services5" are outside the exemption.
d. Incidental to Aircraft. An exemption is granted to carriers of property or passengers incidental to aircraft transportation in section 303 (b) (7a). The regulations governing this exemption are in Motor Transportationof PassengersIncidental to
Transportationby Aircraft.51 These require that the passenger
have an immediate prior or subsequent movement by air and that
the transportation be within the union of an area encompassing
a 25 mile radius around the airport and all the commercial zones
which intersect this 25 mile radius. The ICC has the power to
2
expand this exempt area if factual circumstances so warrant.
e. Commercial Zones. The MCA exempts transportation
within contiguous municipalities and their adjacent "commercial
zones." 53 These zones are defined explicitly for most large metropolitan areas in Part 1048 of the Code of FederalRegulations. For
smaller cities and towns the commercial zone comprises the central municipality, all towns contiguous to that base and all unincorporated areas and parts of towns within a radius of from two
to five miles of the boundary of the base, depending on its population. When commercial, industrial or demographic conditions
warrant, however, the ICC may redefine a commercial zone ac54
cordingly.
The exemption extends only to the boundaries of a zone so
48. Whitman's Black & White Cab Co., Common Carrier Appli-

cation, 47 M.C.C. 737, 740 (1948).

49. Peters, Common Carrier Application, 23 M.C.C. 611 (1940).
50. Bevacqua, Common Carrier Application, 73 M.C.C. 751 (1957).
51.

95 M.C.C. 526 (1964).

52. See, e.g., Hatom Corp., Common Carrier Application, 88 M.C.C.

653 (1962); Teterboro Motor Transp., Inc., Common Carrier Application,
47 M.C.C. 247, 255 (1947).
53. 49 U.S.C. § 303(b) (8) (Supp. IV, 1969) exempts:

[t]he transportation of passengers or property in interstate or
foreign commerce wholly within a municipality or between contiguous municipalities or within a zone adjacent to and commercially a part of any such municipality or municipalities, except

when such transportation is under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage ... to or from a
point without such municipality, municipalities, or zone, and
provided that the motor carrier engaged in such transportation
of passengers over regular or irregular route or routes in inter-

state commerce is also lawfully engaged in the intrastate transportation of passengers over the entire length of such interstate
route or routes in accordance with the laws of each State having
jurisdiction ....
54. 49 C.F.R. Part 1048 (1970).
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defined and routes within overlapping commercial zones may
not be added. 55 Unless specifically limited, an ICC authority to
serve a municipality is valid within the adjacent commercial
zone.5 6 This exemption is intended to cover all local transportation in interstate commerce, not merely those carriers whose
routes cross state lines. 57

However, it may be voided if the

transportation is under the common control or management of
another carrier which may perform continuous carriage to a point
outside the zone. 58
Also, the carrier must conduct a corresponding intrastate
business, in full compliance with the relevant state laws, over the
routes which it uses in its interstate activity.5 For example, if
a person transports passengers, within a commercial zone, from
point X in state 1 to point Y in state 2, he must obtain intrastate
operating authority from state 1 for his routes from X to the state
line and likewise from state 2 for routes between the border and
Y. In addition, he must actually conduct intrastate operations
along his routes between X and Y and the state line.
Section 302(c) provides a similar exemption for transportation within the "terminal area" of another carrier, provided it is
under an agreement with that carrier. For the carriage of goods,
the terminal area is coextensive with the commercial zone of the
municipality but for passenger services it is confined to the ac0
tual limits of the town.6
f. Section 304(a) (4a), Certificate of Exemption. Section
304(a) (4a) makes it the duty of the Commission to determine if
the services of a petitioning carrier "lawfully engaged in operation solely within a single State," do not "substantially . . .af-

fect" uniform regulation and implementation of the national
transportation policy. Upon such a finding, the ICC may grant
the carrier a "certificate of exemption."0 1 This exemption af55. Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 46 M.C.C. 665 (1946).
56. Ex parteNo. MC-37, 54 M.C.C. 21 (1952).

57. Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 46 LC.C. 665 (1946).

58. E.g., Greyhound Corp., Investigation, 84 M.C.C. 169 (1960). But
see Potomac Edison Co., Determination of Status, 48 M.C.C. 266, 270
(1948) (in spite of common control, the ICC upheld an exemption where
the applicant proposed a purely local service with no through tickets,
joint rates or interchange of passengers with the commonly controlled
carrier).
59. A.B. & W. Transit Co. v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 83 M.C.C.
547, 551 (1960).
60. Commercial Zones and Terminal Areas, 54 M.C.C. 615 (1952).
61. 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (4a) (1964). The section also provides that
the ICC is to:
determine, upon its own motion, or upon application by... any
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fords an alternative method of carrying on interstate commerce,
under regulation, without the burden of federal compliance
02
where the carrier's interstate operations are not substantial.
The exemption is based first on the premise that the carrier's
operation is essentially local; thus it is necessary that its activities
be completely within one state. A second assumption is that the
carrier will be regulated by state authorities. Exemptions have
been denied where state authority has not been obtained 3 or
was not required.0 4 The Commission may deny a certificate of
exemption if it would give the applicant a competitive advantage.
A similar but more limited exemption may be granted under
section 306(a) (6)-(7). This exemption applies only to common carriers and is available only if the carrier is lawfully engaged in operation solely within a given state, without any interest in out-of-state carriers. Further, it must have obtained a
certificate of public convenience and necessity for intrastate operations from a state board under standards similar to those governing the ICC.
g. Free or Reduced-Rate Transportation. Section 317 (b)
provides that sections 1 (7) and 22 shall apply to common carriers
by motor vehicle. These sections permit common carriers of
passengers to offer free or reduced-rate transportation to various
categories of people, including inmates of hospitals and charitable
institutions, "indigent, destitute and homeless persons, and to
such persons when transported by charitable societies or hospitals or societies" and to municipal governments for the transportation of indigent persons.
other party in interest, whether the transportation in interstate
S.. commerce performed by any motor carrier or class of motor
carriers lawfully engaged in operation solely within a single
State is in fact of such nature . . . as not substantially to affect . . . uniform regulation by the Commission . . . in effectuating the national transportation policy ....
Upon so finding. the Commission shall issue a certificate of exemption
which . . . shall exempt such carrier or class of motor carriers
from compliance with the provisions of this chapter, and shall
attach to such certificate such reasonable terms and conditions
as the public interest may require. At any time after the issuance of any such certificate of exemption, the Commission may
by order revoke all or any part thereof . . . . [W]here a motor
carrier has become exempt.
as provided in this subparagraph,
it shall not be considered to be a burden on interstate ... commerce for a State to regulate such carrier with respect to the
operations covered by such exemption.
62. International Ry. Exemption Application, 44 M.C.C. 789, 793
(1945); Slocum, 30 M.C.C. 169, 172 (1941).
63. Miller Exemption Application, 41 M.C.C. 783 (1943).
64. Winter Exemption Application, 32 M.C.C. 679, 684 (1942).
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The case law deals primarily with the terms under which
passes can be granted and the duties which will be owed by carriers to passengers riding under these provisions. In McGowan,
Common Carrier Application, 5 however, the ICC held that a carrier serving only clients of charitable institutions was not within
the purview of the Act.
h. Temporary Authority. The Commission has the discretion to grant, without a hearing, temporary operating authority
to common or contract carriers "[t]o enable the provision of
service for which there is an immediate and urgent need to a
point or points or within a territory having no carrier service
capable of meeting such need ...

."60

The carrier must make

a strong showing of both urgent need and unavailability of adequate alternative service. 6 7 This type of authority may continue
up to 180 days but does not create a presumption in favor of the
issuance of a permanent authority. The carrier's operations under a temporary authority are subject to all the provisions of
the Act 68
5. Status of DAB
Most manifestations of DAB would be classified by the ICC
as "special operations." In Asbury Park-N.Y. Transit Corp. v.
Bingler Vacation Tours, Inc., 9 the Commission said that this cat
egory was "a catchall classification which may include almost
anything which is neither charter service ...

nor one of the

'usual' operations of ordinary regular-route common carriers of
passengers." 70 Such operations are common carriage requiring
a certificate of public convenience and necessity.7 ' Section 3 (b),
above, contains a variety of examples of carriers with irregular
routes and schedules and unconventional service ideas, all of
which were classified as common carriers or special operations.
It is conceivable that some DAB applications would be contract carriage. Others that were highly localized might qualify
65. 33 M.C.C. 888 (1942).
66. 49 U.S.C. § 310a(a) (1964).
67. See, e.g., Black Ball Freight Service v. United States, 298 F.
Supp. 1006 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Acme Cartage Co. v. United States, 290
F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
68. 49 U.S.C. § 310a(c) (1964).
69. 62 M.C.C. 731 (1954), affd, Bingler v. United States, 132 F.
Supp. 793 (D. N.J.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 921 (1955). See also Michaud Bus
Lines, Inc., 100 M.C.C. 432, 443 (1966).
70. 62 MLC.C. at 739 (1954).
71. Fordham Bus Corp. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941).
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for a commercial zone exemption or a certificate of exemption
and be remanded to state regulation. The "aircraft" exemption
would apply to DAB plans providing service from many private
homes to a single airport. Finally, free charity-based services
such as a DAB system serving one or several hospitals, would be
beyond ICC jurisdiction.

B. STATE AND LocAL SYsTEMs
Based on a selective study of state regulatory systems, this
section will examine the scope of state regulation and exemptions
therefrom. An attempt will be made to relate the general scheme
to DAB operations and transit innovations in general.
1.

Scope of State Regulation

No state appears to exempt any carrier from safety and
equipment standards, proper licensing and requirements of financial responsibility. The exemptions to be studied are from
economic regulation, including the control of rates, levels of
service, schedules and routes.
The general state pattern follows a two-step process. First,
the outer boundaries and overall scope of the state commission's
jurisdiction are established. Second, specific exemptions within
these bounds are promulgated. Thus a carrier may be exempted
either by being left outside the commission's authority or by
falling under a specific exception to its general power.
a. The Federal Model. The most limited grant of power
encountered provides the Commission solely with jurisdiction
over "common carriers" or carriers which are "public utilities."
Such a carrier is generally defined to be one "[w] hich, as a regular business, undertakes for hire to carry all persons, within certain limitations, who may apply for passage, and holds itself out
as engaged in such business. ' 72 Delaware, for example, provides
for regulation of public utilities, defined as:
every individual, partnership, association, corporation, joint
stock company,. . . or . . . association of individuals . . . (commonly called a "Cooperative") . . . that . . . operates . . . any

railroad, street railway, traction railway, motor bus, electric
trackless trolley coach, [or] taxicab . . . for public use.

73

Carriers falling within this definition must obtain a certificate
72.
Transp.
Haulage
73.

13 C.J.S. Carriers § 530 (1939).
See also Illinois Highway
Co. v. Hantel, 323 Ill. App. 364, 55 N.E.2d 710 (1944); Motor
Co. v. Maltbie, 293 N.Y. 338, 57 N.E.2d 41 (1944).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 101 (Supp. 1968).
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of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service Com74
mission, but no others need an official operating authority.
The next stage of boundary expansion brings contract carriers within the Commission's mandate. This copies the federal
model and is followed in many states.7 5 "Contract carrier" is defined in various ways, however, and at least two patterns can be
identified. The first follows the Motor Carrier Act by defining
this class as those carriers offering specialized services to a limited number of persons under specific arrangements.-a A more
typical scheme classifies as "contract" all carriers for compensa'77
tion which are not "common.
The states following the latter approach require common carriers to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity
before commencing operation. Some states also require contract
carriers to get certificates,- while others follow the federal
model, requiring permits for contract carriage. 0 The standards
which must be met to obtain these operating authorities are discussed in detail below,80 but in general a stronger showing of
public need is required to obtain a certificate. Both types of authority involve direct economic regulation by the Commission.
b. Non-Federal Classification Systems. Other states define
the jurisdictional scope of their regulatory commissions by combining a group of classifications. Such systems are often highly
articulated and complex. New York, in addition to a series of
categories of carriers of property, has established the class of
"common carrier" for non-motor vehicle common carriers' and
"omnibus corporation" for motor vehicle common carriers.8 2 Although the latter class is defined in terms of fixed routes, the
Public Service Commission has the power "to establish... such
just and reasonable classifications of carriers ... included in the
term 'omnibus line' as the special nature of the services perNew York's
formed by such carriers ... shall require . ."83
74. Id. § 162.
75. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 68-503 to -603 (1967); MIca CozP. LAWS
ANN.ch. 475 (1967); PA. STAT. A nI. tit. 66 (1959); S.D. ComPLE LAws
ANx. ch. 49 (1967).
76. E.g., S.D. COMPLED LAWS ANN. § 49-2-1 (1967).
77. E.g., Mic. CoMp. LAws AN. § 475.1(j) (1967); PA. STAT.AxN.
tit. 66, § 1102(7) (1959).
78. See GA. CODE ANN. § 68-504 (1967).
79. See Micm CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 476.1 (1967).
80. See Section III infra.
81.

N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAW

82. Id.
83. Id. § 61(12-a).

§ 2 (9) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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system also includes the category of "contract carrier of passengers by motor vehicle," which includes all motor vehicle services
for compensation other than "omnibus lines. '8 4 Common carriers and omnibus corporations must obtain certificates while
8 5
contract carriers need permits.
New Jersey has the following six categories for transportation services: "autobus," "charter bus operation," "special bus
operation," "taxicab," "jitney" and "autocab." 80 The first three
may not operate without certificates from the Board of Public
Utilities Commissioners while the latter three cover primarily
local services regulated at the municipal level. Other states with
complex systems of this nature are California, Massachusetts and
Illinois.
Some states (including New York and New Jersey) also require common carriers to obtain a municipal consent or franchise
from each town in which the service will be offered. Consents,
permits and certificates are all detailed regulatory documents.
2. Classification
a. Compensation. Many states have effectively extended
the boundaries of their regulatory systems to include all passenger transportation services for compensation. In such states the
presence of compensation becomes a threshold question.
In Chauncy v. Kinnaird,8 7 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that a share-the-expense car pool in a private automobile
was not the type of "commerce" demanding regulation under the
Kentucky public carrier statute. The court reasoned that the
passage of value to pay the costs of a trip of mutual convenience,
where the transportation was incidental to a primary purpose,
was trivial and represented no evasion.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court also follows this reasoning.
In PhiladelphiaAssociation of Wholesale Opticians v. Public Utilities Commission,8 while upholding the statutory exemption of a
co-operative delivery service, the court stated obiter: "If three
neighbors. . hire a chauffeur. . . to drive their children to and
from school and divide the expenses incident thereto among
themselves . . without any profit or compensation to any of
them, it is nobody else's business."8 9
84.

Id. § 2(32).

87.

279 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).

85. Id. §§ 63-d, 63-k & 63-n(1).
86. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:4-1 et seq. (1969).
88. 152 Pa. Super. 89, 30 A.2d 712 (1943).
89. Id. at 100, 30 A.2d at 718 (dictum).
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Any service which goes beyond these very private, incidental
operations, however, probably will be classified as one involving
compensation. For example, a 16 member group which operated
a small bus for its own members' commutation on a share-theexpense basis was held by the Supreme Court of Washington to
be "in the business of.
. transporting persons, for compensation . . ,90
In general, value need not pass from the passengers to the
carrier in order to constitute "for hire" carriage. Payment by an
employer to the carrier for the transportation of his employees to
and from work, 91 or by a landlord for his tenants,9 2 will suffice.
The benefit to the carrier can also be indirect, as in the case
where the owner of an apartment building or a housing development provides a service to his tenants or residents and receives
03
his reward through enhanced rents or property values.

b. Statutory Categories. Once a new carrier establishes
that it is within the bounds of a Commission's jurisdiction, it is
faced with two questions of classification. The first task is to
determine its statutory categorization; the second is to analyze
its eligibility for an exemption.
Given the variety of statutory definitions, it is difficult to
develop any generalizations which will provide a reliable guide
for a specific carrier. If a state follows the federal model, Section
I above may provide helpful analogies. Otherwise, some tentative statements are possible, and illustrative examples may be
useful.
Traditional fixed-route and fixed-schedule bus operators are
always in the common carrier classification or its equivalent
(e.g., "omnibus" in New York or "autobus" in New Jersey).
Taxicabs and jitneys are also common carriers but are generally
regulated locally. Charter bus services appear to be classified as
either common or contract carriers unless the state has a specific
category for these modes; limousine services are treated similarly.
Tour bus trips, arranged by the carrier, are common carriage but
may fall into a "special operations" classification.
90. Horluck Transp. Co. v. Eckright, 56 Wash. 2d 218, 221, 352 P.2d
205, 206 (1960).
91. E.g., Short Line, Inc. v. Quinn, 298 Mass. 360, 10 N.E.2d 112
(1937).
92. E.g., Surface Transp. Corp. v. Reservoir Bus Lines, Inc., 271
App. Div. 556, 67 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1946).
93. See, e.g., Columbia Transit Co., 55 P.U.R.3d 555 (N.J. Bd. of
Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 1964); Lockbourne Manor, Inc., 50 P.U.R.3d 271 (N.J.
Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 1963).
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State classification systems are based primarily on vehicle
size, route patterns and service area. None of the statutes manifests much solicitude for technological change. There are, however, examples of classification of carriers with innovative service or organizational concepts which may illuminate the problems
of DAB.
c. Services Operated by Employers or Employees. In Horluck TransportationCo. v. Eckright,94 a group of employees of a
single employer operated a small bus for their own convenience
in commuting. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the
group was not a common carrier but an "auto transportation
company" which, under Washington law, also needed a certificate.
The court declined, however, to issue an injunction while the
group petitioned for a certificate; it further suggested that the
Commission might find that such carriers could qualify for a
certificate under more lenient standards than those for a common
carrier.
In a memorandum dealing with car pools for compensation,
the Connecticut Public Utilities Commission stated that such arrangements are contract carrier services subject to limited business regulation, including the setting of minimum rates so as to
protect common carriers. 95
Various courts have held that persons who, under contract
with an employer, pick up workers at specified points and carry
them to and from work are contract carriers 0 Massachusetts
and New Jersey, on the other hand, have categorized such services as common carriage 7 The Appellate Court of Illinois
reached the latter result and enjoined an uncertificated carrier
who indiscriminately gave contracts to any rider who claimed he
was an employee at one of four plants. The carrier then modified his operation by entering formal contracts with the employees who wanted his service and then carrying only those who
could so identify themselves. The Commission held that this did
not violate the injunction and was, in fact, a private contract
94.

56 Wash. 2d 218, 352 P.2d 205 (1960).

95. Livery Service, 2 P.U.R. (n.s.) 387 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1933).
96. See, e.g., Illinois Highway Transp. Co. v. Hantel, 323 Ill. App.
364, 55 N.E.2d 710 (1944); Baltimore & A. R.R. v. Lichtenberg, 176 Md.
383, 4 A.2d 734 (1939).
97. Short Line, Inc. v. Quinn, 298 Mass. 360, 10 N.E.2d 112 (1937);
Doskovitch v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 103 N.J.L. 570, 138 A. 110

(Sup. Ct. 1927) (employee bus between town and plant is an "autobus").

1971]

DIAL-A-BUS

service outside its jurisdiction.98
d. TransportationClubs. Another common type of specialized service involves commutation for a club, the members
brought together only by common areas of residence and work.
In Hill's Jitney Service, Inc. v. Stiltz, Inc.,°9 the members of such
a club paid dues and a monthly or daily fare to the club which, in
turn, paid a flat monthly fee in advance to the carrier. The Commission found that this was not a "public utility" since membership was limited in size and thus was not subject to regulation at
all under Delaware law.100 The Commission indicated, however,
that the club might become a public utility if it failed to keep its
membership sufficiently limited.
In a similar case in New York, where each member paid a
flat monthly assessment whether he rode or not, the New York
Supreme Court found that the group had sufficient "common
purpose" to form a bona fide "charter party."''1
Although the
bus ran daily on a fixed route and schedule, and club membership
was largely unrestricted, the court felt that the Commission was
within its discretion to find this to be a charter operation, lawfully run under a contract carriage permit.
On similar facts, however, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld a Commission classification of
"autobus," refusing to call a daily operation over fixed routes
for an indefinite future a "charter operation." The court found a
legislative intent to establish a comprehensive scheme of control
over autobus service, allowing exemptions only where specifically
102
granted.
In Chicago North Shore and Milwaukee Railway v. North
Shore Transit Club, 0 3 the respondent was organized to meet the
transportation needs of domestic workers living on the south
side of Chicago and working in north shore suburbs. The club
was very loose in structure and was organized by an entrepreneur who did not personally use the service. Members had only
98. Jacksonville Bus Line Co. v. Watson, 344 fII. App. 175, 100 N.E.
2d.391 (1951).
99. 23 P.U.R.3d 461 (Del Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958).
100. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 101 (Supp. 1968).
101. In re Rockland Transit Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 29 Misc.
2d 909, 221 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
102. Public Serv. Coord. Transp. v. Super Serv. Bus Co., 82 N.J.
Super. 371, 197 A.2d 700 (1964). See also Eley Bus Co., N.J. Bd. Pub.
Util. Comm'rs No. 673-121 (1967); Trenton & Mercer County Traction
Corp. v. Trenton, 97 N.J.L. 84, 116 A. 321 (Sup. Ct), affd, 98 N.J.L. 297,
119 A. 31 (1922) (the act is a comprehensive scheme of regulation).
103. 46 P.U.R.3d 381 (l. Comm. Comm'n 1962).
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to identify themselves to a "liaison"; there were no dues or other
indicia of membership organization and no formal contracts with
the riders. The Commission found that a "public use" was estabin
lished when "service is available on equal terms to everyone
10 4
It
that community or in that class or part of the community."
then distinguished this service from those in the Hantel and
Jacksonville cases,10 5 as well as the specifications of "private contract carriage" set forth in a previous commission order.100 It
found the "club" to be a public utility requiring a certificate of
public convenience and necessity.
e. Services Restricted by Residence. A third type of restricted service is one offered to the residents of a building or
development, usually by the proprietor. The Pennsylvania
courts have held that such services are not public utilities and
are beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, provided the recipients are a well-defined group limited in both character and
size. 10 7 However, in New York and New Jersey, services of this
type, even when limited, have been found to be common carriage. 0 8
f. Organizations Serving Their Clients. A similar situation
arises when organizations operate services for their clients. A
common example is school bus operation, usually subject only to
local regulation. Courts have held that these are common carriers if they accept all students of given schools. 100 Similarly, in
State ex rel. Public Utilities Commission v. Nelson," 0 the Supreme Court of Utah held that an operator who carried guests
under contract with a camp was a contract carrier outside the
Commission's jurisdiction. Although the route paralleled that of
104.

Id. at 389.

105. Jacksonville Bus Line Co. v. Watson, 344 Ill. App. 175, 100
N.E.2d 391 (1951); Illinois Highway Transp. Co. v. Hantel, 323 Ill. App.

364, 55 N.E.2d 710 (1944).
106. Cavallo Bus Lines, Inc., 96 P.U.R. (n.s.) 621 (Ill. Comm. Comm'n
1952).

107. Drexelbrook Assoc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 418 Pa. 430, 212
A.2d 237 (1965); Aronimink Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 111

Pa. Super. 414, 170 A. 375 (1934).

See also State ex rel. North Carolina

Util. Comm'n v. McKinnon, 254 N.C. 1, 118 S.E.2d 134 (1961).

108. Surface Transp. Corp. v. Reservoir Bus Lines, Inc., 271 App.
Div. 556, 67 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1946); Columbia Transit Co., 55 P.U.R.3d 555
(N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1964); Lockbourne Manor, Inc., 50
P.U.R.3d 271 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1963).
109. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Columbo, 118 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct.,
Special Term 1952) (the class of students is not a sufficiently limited segment of the public). See also Illinois Comm. Comm'n v. Galvin, 44
Ill. App. 2d 67, 194 N.E.2d 374 (1963).
110. 65 Utah 457, 238 P. 237 (1925).
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a certificated common carrier, the court based its finding on the
fact that there was no willingness to serve all who applied for
carriage. The Utah Code has since been amended to regulate
contract carriers of passengers."1 '
g. Small-scale Services. Many small-scale, specialized
transportation services have been before the commissions and the
courts. A limousine service operating between La Guardia Airport and Manhattan, under contract with certain airlines and the
city, was held to be an omnibus line in Public Service Commission v. Grand Central Cadillac Renting Corp.1 12 In New Jersey,
a carrier who, using seven-passenger vehicles, picked up patrons
at their homes in response to telephone calls and took them to
Times Square, was held to be an "autobus."' 13 Similar services,
however, have been found to be contract carriers in other
states." 4 On-call livery or limousine services have also been
found to be both taxicabs" 5 and private services exempt from
local taxi regulation." 6
Auto rental services, in which the lessee drives the car and
controls its routes while the lessor retains responsibility for
maintenance, generally have been held to be contract carriers. 1 7
Recreation Lines, Inc., operated a small-group limousine
service between Manhattan and local race tracks. Passengers
were publicly solicited but they had to make appointments and
could be picked up only at a terminal or another pre-arranged
point. Only people who had made the outbound trip or had
made reservations were brought back. Routes were determined
by passenger needs. The Public Service Commission granted the
carrier a contract permit and the Appellate Division affirmed.
The court felt that the contract carrier statute's required find111. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-6-1 & 54-6-8 (1963).
112. 273 App. Div. 595, 78 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1948).
113. Nutley-Times Square Serv., Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs,
109 N.J.L 289, 162 A. 124 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (the Board had to classify this
interstate carrier in order to apply the proper safety regulations and the
court upheld its classification).
114. E.g., Realty Purchasing Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 9 Utah
2d 375, 345 P.2d 606 (1959).
115. Chasteen v. Decatur, 21 Ill. App. 2d 496, 158 N.E.2d 446 (1959).
116. See, e.g., People v. Cassese, 43 Misc. 2d 869, 251 N.Y.S.2d 540
(Westchester County Ct. 1964); People v. Pfingst, 1 Misc. 2d 890, 148
N.Y.S.2d 640 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1956); People v. Sullivan, 199 Misc. 524,
103 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Ct. Spec. Sess. N.Y.C. 1951).
117. See, e.g., Mecham Pontiac Corp. v. Williams, 94 Ariz. 144, 382
P.2d 558 (1963); Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Blanton, 305 Ky.
178, 202 S.W.2d 433 (1947); People v. S &E Motor Hire Corp., 29 N.Y.S.2d
105 (Ct. Spec. Sess. N.Y.C. 1941).
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ing of "transportation of a group for a common purpose, under a
special agreement" was supported by substantial evidence.1 18
In In re Joe Galik,119 however, the California Railroad Commission found the carrier to be a common carrier. Galik operated a sedan type vehicle between San Francisco and Los Angeles,
soliciting passengers on the street and in hotels. The Commission
stated that fixed routes and schedules were not necessary to constitute common carriage: frequent operation between fixed
points was held sufficient. Ignoring "contracts" which the carrier executed with a straw man after it had organized a group,
the Commission found a public holding out rather than a charter
service.
3.

Exemptions

a. General. All the state statutes surveyed include some
partial or total exemptions from economic regulation. Exemptions are generally of two types-those which delegate the responsibility for regulation to the municipal or metropolitan level
and those which provide a complete exemption from regulation.
These may arise from either the statutory definitions or specific
statutory provisions. Most are based on the character of the
service offered and a few arise from the structural organization
of the carrier. In addition, most statutes provide for temporary
operating authorities.
State exemptions include the private carriage of one's own
goods without compensation, the carriage of a variety of agricultural and other commodities in their raw state, the exemption of
properly organized agricultural cooperatives, commercial zone
and terminal area exemptions for operations in municipalities
and contiguous areas, services operated by municipalities, casual
operations, the carriage of school children, church buses, hotel
and airport buses, taxicabs and jitneys.
b. Intergovernmental. Most states offer partial exemptions
empowering their municipalities to play a coordinate regulatory
role. In Pennsylvania, for example:
Each city may regulate the transportation . . . of passengers
The city may
* * . for pay, within the limits of the city ....
impose reasonable license fees, make regulations for the operation of vehicles, the rates to be charged ... and may designate
118. In re Recreation Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 7 App.
Div. 2d 20, 179 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1958).
119. Joe Galik, d/b/a Acme Travel Assoc., 20 P.U.R. (n.s.) 303 (Cal.

R.R. Comm'n 1937).
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certain20 streets upon which such vehicles ... must be operated.'

In New Jersey, the "local" types of carriers (taxicabs, jitneys
and autocabs) are regulated primarily by the towns, with the
Board of Public Utilities Commissioners playing a supervisory
role. Autobuses, on the other hand, must obtain a municipal
21
consent before they can apply to the Board for a certificate.'
Given this interlocking of regulatory authority, it is vital that a
new carrier consult both the municipal corporation statutes and
the transportation or public utility statutes of its state.
Another type of exemption from state regulation is achieved
by delegation to metropolitan authorities. In Pennsylvania, for
example, these authorities have broad power to design and operate mass transportation facilities, exempt from the Public Service
Commission's jurisdiction within the metropolitan area but subject to it outside. 1 22 Such authorities have control over "transportation systems" which include "all property ... useful for the
transportation of passengers for hire, . . . as well as the fran-

chises, rights and licenses therefor, including rights to provide
group and party services: Provided, That such term shall not
include taxicabs.'

2

3

Furthermore, "[t]he authority shall deter-

mine by itself exclusively, after appropriate public hearing, the
facilities to be operated by it, the services to be available to the
public, and the rates to be charged therefor."' 2 4 Other states do
not grant such broad certification and regulatory powers to their
metropolitan authorities, but these represent another level of
government whose requirements must be met by new carriers.
This type of authority also may provide a carrier an opportunity to be shielded from both state and local regulation and,
in effect, to go unregulated at the sufferance of the authority.
There have also been exemptions at the local level whereby livery or limousine services were allowed to operate free of the eco12 -5
nomic and service regulations imposed on taxicabs.
120. PA. STAT. AN.
tit. 53, § 4511 (1957).
121. N.J. STAT. A .§ 48:4-3 (1969).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 2004 (Supp. 1970).
123. Id. § 2003 (a) (8). Pennsylvania is different than most states in
that the Commission retains primary jurisdiction over taxicabs. Hoffman v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 99 Pa. Super. 417 (1930). In other states
this is a closely guarded local prerogative.
124. Pa- STAT. AN. tit. 66, § 2004(d) (9) (Supp. 1970).
125. See, e.g., People v. Cassese, 43 Misc. 2d 869, 251 N.Y.S.2d 540
(Westchester County Ct. 1964); People v. Sullivan, 199 lisc. 524, 103

N.Y.S.2d 503 (Ct. Spec. Sess. N.Y.C. 1951). But see Chasteen v. Decatur,
21 Ill. App. 2d 496, 497, 158 N.E.2d 446, 447 (1959) (a livery service was

found to be within the statutory definition--"A taxicab is... a vehicle
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c. Specialized Services. Illinois provides an example of an
exemption based on the nature of a carrier's service since the
statute has no provision for the regulation of contract carriers
of passengers. The Hante126 and Jacksonville1 27 cases classify
carriers of employees of specific plants who have prior contracts
with their passengers as "private contract carriers" beyond the
1 28
jurisdiction of the Commission.
On the other hand, Pennsylvania appears to grant an exemption based on the cooperative organization of a carrier. The
Pennsylvania statute states that "Contract Carrier by Motor Vehicle" shall not include "any bona fide agricultural cooperative association transporting property exclusively for the members of
such association on a nonprofit basis .... '129 In addition, it requires a public utility to obtain a certificate of public convenience
and necessity before it may commence operation. 18 0 Thus the
statute, by its terms, excludes agricultural cooperatives from
common carrier status.
That they may also be exempt from regulation as contract
carriers is supported by the Superior Court's reasoning in Philadelphia Association of Wholesale Opticians v. Public Service
Commission.'3 ' The court found a cooperative delivery service
to be excluded from both the common carrier and the contract
carrier provisions of the statute. The court reasoned that section
1310 of title 66 empowers the Commission to set minimum rates
for contract carriers if it finds them necessary to promote the
policy of protection of common carriers enunciated in that provision. Given this limited regulatory mandate, the court said:
[T]he compensation, rates, etc., thus to be prescribed [under
section 1310] are not applicable to a situation such as this, where
the members of a cooperative association simply divide among
themselves the cost or expenses of the operations, without profit
to them or any of them ....
And if nine or ten persons ...
requiring special and individual delivery service, use a nonprofit
business corporation, of which they are all members, . . . to
act as their agent in furnishing transportation to them and to
for hire by passengers not having any fixed route or schedule"-and
therefore subject to local taxi regulation).
126. Illinois Highway Transp. Co. v. Hantel, 323 fll. App. 364, 55
N.E.2d 710 (1944).
127. Jacksonville Bus Line Co. v. Watson, 344 IM. App. 175, 100
N.E.2d 391 (1951).

128.
Comm'n
common
129.
130.
131.

See also Hill's Jitney Service, 23 P.U.R.3d 461 (Del. Pub. Serv.
1958) (a limited employee service was held to be other than a
carrier and thus outside the Commission's jurisdiction).
PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1102(7) (6) (Supp. 1970).
Id. §§ 1121-22.
152 Pa. Super. 89, 30 A.2d 712 (1943).
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nobody else, . . . without profit or compensation to any of them,
that... is ... not subject to the regulation of the Public Utility
"132
Commission ....

This reasoning has not been tested for a cooperative passenger service or for an organization with a larger number of
members. 3 3 However, it might provide a basis for the exemp-

tion of certain types of DAB service.
d. Temporary Authority. Most state commissions are authorized to grant temporary operating authorities. Generally
these are of limited duration and may be granted only to meet
a seasonal or emergency need. Such an authority usually does
not exempt a carrier from regulation, nor does it create a presumption in favor of the grant of permanent authority. Emergency is generally narrowly defined and does not include the

need for experimentation and innovation.
4. Status of Dial-a-Bus
A transit innovator, unless sponsored by a government body

such as a state department of transportation or a transit authority, will have to comply with a state regulatory system. This
will probably be similar to the systems described above.
Certain conclusions can be made regarding the relationship
of DAB to this general framework. A many-to-many service,
open to the general public or a limited class thereof, would fall
within the state's "common carrier" category. A feeder service or an operation serving all employees of a given plant likewise probably would be common carriage.
By limiting its clientele as, for example, by entering into
contracts with specific employees or the members of some other

group with a common interest, DAB might achieve an exemption
in some states, including illinois and Delaware. In others it
would be allowed to operate under the less onerous regulation of
a contract carrier permit. In still others, such as New Jersey,
even this limited service would be common carriage. Smallerscale operations such as this would not fully utilize the DAB
technology. If they could qualify for exemptions or more
lenient regulation, however, they would provide considerable
leeway for innovation and experimentation with new service
and management concepts.
132.

Id. at 100-01, 30 A.2d at 718.

133. In Aronomink Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comn'n, 111 Pa.
Super. 414, 170 A. 375 (1934), a limited service to two apartment buildings having 800 tenants was held to be exempt.
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It is possible that in a given state it would be advantageous
for political or other reasons to avoid state regulation in favor
of metropolitan or local control. This might be achieved by
qualifying for a municipal or commercial zone exemption, by
coming within a "taxicab" definition or by operating under the
aegis of a public authority.
No state regulatory system explicitly recognizes the need
or provides encouragement for technological and service innovation. In practice, classification schemes tend to obstruct
change, and the available exemptions either delegate regulatory
authority or are of limited scope. The next section proposes a
new regulatory concept-the experimental exemption-to meet
this problem.

C. THE

EXPERIMENTAL EXEMPTION

This section first describes the need for innovation and demand-oriented market mechanisms in the passenger transportation industry. It then outlines an "experimental exemption"
which would foster technological and managerial innovation and
result in a more balanced system with a greater range of consumer options.
1. The Need for Innovation and Market Response
In the Department of Housing and Urban Development report, Tomorrow's Transportation, the following criticism appears:
Major railings of the entire urban transportation system today are lack of both change and capacity for change, resulting in
a restricted choice of ways for people to get around the city and

the metropolitan area. The common characterization of urban
transportation modes as a blunt dichotomy between public rail

transit and the private automobile is far too simple. Cities are

the most pluralistic places in modern society; their citizens need
a wide range of travel services, a mix of transportation services
carefully designed to meet their varying travel needs.l '3

This observation suggests several needs for public transportation which the present system has not met.
The first of these arises from the role of transportation in
the problems of the poor. A variety of studies has shown that
inadequate public transportation is an important obstacle to the
attempts of the urban poor to find satisfactory employment and
134. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEv., URBAN TRANSP. ADMIN.,
TOMORROW'S TRANSPORTATION 7 (1968).
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achieve residential, social and economic mobility.13 5 "Reverse
commute" bus schemes have failed to attract and hold ridership,
largely due to limitations of present technological and service
concepts. Such buses are unable to travel quickly to a large
number of destinations and cannot be scheduled with sufficient
flexibility to allow people to work second shifts or overtime.
However, people have used these buses as a means for finding a
better job and then have made other arrangements, usually car
pools, for commuting. Thus, these schemes provide an example
of both the weakness of present technology and the importance
and beneficial aspects of new transportation ideas.
In addition, new consumer-oriented transit services would
contribute to community control and minority economic development in poverty areas. They would provide both employment
and opportunities for local management and entrepreneurship.
Another unmet transportation need is represented by the
problems of the "transit poor," people who for various reasons
have inadequate mobility. This group includes but is not confined to the poverty-stricken. It also embraces the aged and the
young, the handicapped, nondrivers, drivers without access to a
car and people not provided with a minimum of public transit. 3 0
Still another set of unmet needs results from changed residential patterns in metropolitan areas. Low density suburban
development produces demands for interradial trips and doorto-door service. The dispersal of employment and shopping centers accentuates the need for flexible routing. The high level of
transport service provided by the automobile cannot be matched
by present transit modes. In addition, the extension of line-haul
facilities into suburban areas requires the development of new
feeder services.
In addition, there are undoubtedly other needs hidden within
the "latent demand" for transportation-the trips never made.
Experiments suggest that the best way to reach this demand is
135. See, e.g., J. McCoNE, VIOLENC IN TME CrTY: AN EID OR A
BEGInuNG, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR'S CoIussION ON THE LOS ANGSLES RIoT (1965); D. Gurin, The Physical Mobility of the Poor: An Introductory Overview, 1969 (Master's Thesis, Harvard Univ. Grad. School of
Design); Haar, Transportation and Economic Opportunity, 21 T4m nc
QUARTERLY, Oct. 1967; Kain & Meyer, Transportation and Poverty,
THE PuBLIc INTEREST, Winter 1970; Wohl, The Urban Transportation
Problem: A Brief Analysis of Our Objectives and the Prospects for
Current Proposals, 1970 (material prepared for course in Introduction
to Urban Legal Studies, Harvard Law School).
136. Gurin, supra note 135, at 16.
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dramatically to improve the level of service. 1 7
A final impetus for transportation innovation is the critical
need to reduce automobile usage. The problems of pollution
and congestion make this imperative and yet ridership on traditional transit modes continues to decline. To offer public alternatives which can match the convenience, flexibility and
status of the private car will require significant improvement
of both vehicles and management and a revolution in service
concepts.
In the face of this growing need for transportation, however, public transit has remained largely unchanged. The hardware of surface passenger transportation has remained essentially the same for 50 years, comprising the automobile, the bus
and the railway car. As Schneider points out:
The very words "mass transportation" have created much of
the problems facing the transit industry, for "mass" implies a
homogeneous demand which can be accommodated by a standardized product. Yet we know that in every other aspect of
urban life, heterogeneity is the rule....
Yet, what of the transit industry? It, for the most part,
continues to offer relatively standardized boxes on . . . wheels
... rich and poor, worker and shopper, young and
for all
38
old.'
The present period appears to be a significant turning point,
however, in that a variety of new ideas is being suggested and
studied, including the hovercraft, different types of dual-mode
vehicles, personal transit schemes, automated highways, moving
sidewalks and sophisticated communication and vehicle-control
schemes. Some of these plans require large-scale research and
development efforts. Some do not, however, and a more competitive and innovative climate would foster the generation of
new concepts and applications.
2. PresentInstitutionalFrameworkfor Innovation
Achieving better, more comfortable service, however, is
largely dependent on an environment conducive to management
innovation and market responsiveness. That this need implies
institutional responses in order to foster transit innovation has
been recognized by government. The HUD report, Tomorrow's
137. E.g., Lessons for CARS from Peoria, Flint, and Mansfield,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Project CARS, Memo CARSDOT-19, Cambridge, Mass. (Jan. 19, 1970).
138. L. Schneider, Marketing Urban Mass Transit, Jan. 14, 1970, (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Highway Research Board)
at 1.

DIAL-A-BUS

19711

Transportation,states, "An improved institutional frameworklegal, financial, governmental, and intergovernmental-is needed
to eliminate rigidities and anachronisms which prevent the adoption of new technologies and methods." 130 On the state level,
Pennsylvania, for example, has also recognized that "there exists
in the urban and suburban communities in metropolitan areas,
traffic congestion and serious mass transportation problems because of underdeveloped, uncoordinated obsolete mass transportation facilities ... ."140
To meet this problem, many states have created metropolitan
transportation authorities with comprehensive powers. Several
other states have established departments of transportation.
This approach has at once both potentials and dangers. Such
agencies are suitable for assuming control of a failing system of
commuter railroads or line-haul buses. They also may be the
best response to the need for large scale hardware research and
development. Many of the problems outlined above, however,
are diverse, small-scale transit needs. Their solution requires
specialized service concepts, not large infusions of capital. An
example is a medicar service operated by a hospital in Nassau
County, New York. Using two nine-seat minibuses, the service
carries 300 patients per week, 40 percent of the hospital's total
outpatients, at a cost of $16,800 per year.
It is unlikely that an authority or department will be able to
respond on this scale, with this type of sensitivity to local needs,
throughout a complex and various state or metropolitan area.
In fact, as the operator of the large scale line-haul carriers, these
agencies may become actively hostile to innovative, specialized
operations.
Moreover, present regulatory systems, which tend to require certificates of all passenger carriers and provide only
limited exemptions, obstruct change. In order to develop imaginative management and services, market mechanisms must be
allowed to operate. The danger is described by Schneider:
In the name of coordinated metropolitan transportation, a sort
of perverse conglomerate will emerge. Independent suburban
bus companies and the remaining central city private transit
operations will be purchased with public funds ....
The most
uneconomic labor practices and compensation schemes will remain as the efficient smaller companies are swallowed up
141

139.
140.

U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBA DEv., supranote 134, at 7.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 2002(a) (Supp. 1970).

141. Schneider, supranote 138, at 4.
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The Pennsylvania legislature seems to be pointing in this
direction when it finds:
[t]hat the foregoing conditions cannot be effectively dealt with
by private enterprise under existing law . . . and are beyond
remedy or control by governmental regulatory processes; ....
That it is desirable that the public transportation systems in
the metropolitan areas be combined, improved, extended and
supplemented by the creation of authorities ....
That it is intended that such authorities cooperate with
and/or acquire existing transportation facilities that private
enterprise and government may mutually provide adequate
transit facilities .... 142
This point of view overlooks the promotional power of an
exemption from regulation. In the District of Columbia, for
example, taxi service is largely unregulated and a large, cheap
fleet of taxis exists, while service in medallion-system cities like
Boston is critically deficient. 143 The inhibiting quality of the
present regulation is also illustrated by the efforts of members
Boston to establish flexible
of the Roxbury community 1in
44
neighborhood minibus services.
3.

The ExperimentalExemption

The scheme proposed here would compel a Commission to
exempt from economic regulation a transportation service based
on a new concept in technology, management or service. While
the exemption was in force, the carrier would be able to experiment, modifying rates, termini, service levels and so on, in order
to determine the optimum methods for implementing the innovations. If the service proved viable, the commission would have
to grant permanent operating authority.
This section will consider four aspects of such an exemption:
criteria for eligibility, actual operation during the experimental
period, measurement of success or failure and transition to regulated status.
An applicant would first have to show that his proposed
service involved a new concept in either hardware, management
or service for his geographical area of operation. Standards for
measuring "newness" should be developed so as to provide maximum latitude for experimentation without allowing the unregulated duplication of existing services. While management and
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 2002(c), (f) & (h) (Supp. 1970).
143. Kain &Meyer, supra note 135, at 86.
144. Interview with Charles Grigsby, President, Transcom Lines,
Inc., and member of the Governor's Task Force on Transportation, in
Boston, Mass., 1970.
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service innovations will be difficult to evaluate, they are critical
to achieving a flexible, demand-responsive transportation system.
Thus the requirements in these areas should be lenient. The
fact that a carrier and its management will be headquartered
in the neighborhood to be served, for example, might be an important factor in considering an application for exemption.
In addition to new ideas, an applicant should be required to
demonstrate his financial responsibility and his compliance with
state and local safety, registration and licensing laws.
Two problems of public protection should be considered before an exemption is allowed. First, if an experiment fails, passengers who have relied on the service may be hurt. Thus it is
important that the experimental nature of the service be publicly known. People may be unwilling, however, to sacrifice
their existing arrangements for a temporary, albeit superior,
service. A carrier's experiment might fail, although there is a
viable demand, simply because it is experimental. One solution
to this difficulty might be a requirement that the applicant establish a membership corporation. All passengers would then
understand both the nature of the service and that its success
was dependent upon their patronage. Their willingness to
join, perhaps at some cost, would indicate the demand for the
service, the existence of which might be a criterion for the
granting of an exemption.
A second problem arises from the experimenter's effect on
existing carriers. A carrier might lose ridership and incur costs
during an exemption period and then be forced to accommodate
the same riders if the experiment were to fail. As a solution, an
applicant might be required to provide a bond.
Once granted, an exemption should be conditioned so as to
make experimentation as fruitful as possible. Ideally, it would
endure as long as there was any hope of finding a workable
service combination. The period should be long enough to
allow the carrier to overcome the normal losses of a new business. The fact that the operations will incorporate new concepts and technology argues for a longer period of time to allow the experimenter to determine the best way to package,
market and manage his service. A period of two years seems
reasonable.
Another problem arises from multiple applications for exemptions in the same service area. Assuming all applicants are
qualified and offer different services, their exemptions should
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be granted. This is consistent with the goal of exposing all carriers to the discipline of market mechanisms.
During the period of the exemption the Commission should
not interfere with the carrier's operations. He must be allowed
to identify needs and discover the cost-service mix which will
meet consumer demand and make his service successful. Certain financial reports and evaluative data are all that should be
required.
The measurement of success or failure involves difficult factual determinations. It should be tied to the experimental goals
of the carrier. Thus an entrepreneur might be judged on the
profitability of his operations. A service designed to achieve
non-commercial objectives, however, should be evaluated by
other standards. The generation of new demand might be an
important factor. Two showings which should probably be required in any context are the existence of a permanent demand
for the service and the carrier's capacity to continue operations.
Since this article assumes that total deregulation is not
a politically available alternative, procedures for a successful
carrier's transition to a regulated status must be considered.
To prevent operators from making a quick profit from their
exemption and then abandoning service, the Commission should
be able to compel carriers to continue.
Regulation following an exemption should be as flexible as
possible to avoid converting a successful experiment into an
unsuccessful service. Rates might be tied to the cost per unit of
transportation, measured in ways which are sensitive to the
specialized services involved. The Commission should not intervene with regard to the carrier's management and staffing
policies, nor should it regulate service levels. The system should
encourage further experimentation by a successful innovator,
perhaps by creating a presumption in favor of granting him an
exemption for a subsequent untried concept. At the same time,
however, a Commission might have to relax its standards for
service discontinuance by inefficient competitors.
III. ACQUIRING OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY
The preceding sections of this paper have examined the
scope and rationale of present exemptions from state and federal economic regulation of motor carriers, noting and analyzing
arguments in favor of exemption for the several possible manifestations of DAB. In addition, a new exemption in favor of
experimental operations was proposed.
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The focus now shifts to the problem of acquiring the right
to operate:, that is, assuming that no exemption from the regulatory jurisdiction is available, how does one proposing a new
experimental service convince the regulatory body that he should
be allowed to operate?
A. STATE AmuTo-rrIEs
1. Public Convenience and Necessity
State statutes restricting entry into the motor carrier industry, as well as entry into the transportation or public utility
fields generally require that a certificate authorizing the operation shall not issue unless the regulatory commission finds that
the operation is required by the "public convenience and necessity." There are, of course, many variations on this basic
theme. In New Jersey the certificate will issue if the proposed
operation is "necessary and proper for the public convenience
and properly conserves the public interests,"' 45 while in New
York it must be shown that the operations are or "will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity. 1

46

At the federal level, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 es-

tablished a "public convenience and necessity" standard. 47
A few states have the statutory standard that the certificate will issue if the operations are "in the public interest," but
the interpretation has been that "the phrase is either synonymous with public convenience and necessity or includes the latter phrase."'' 48 Oregon has a similar standard, interpreted to be
less restrictive than "public convenience and necessity," in order
to provide less protection for existing carriers than the conven49
1

tional standard.

The public "convenience" cannot be circumscribed to the
extent of holding the term "necessity" to mean an essential requisite.1 50 In an early but leading case in Rhode Island, the
145. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-14 (1969).
146. N.Y. PuB. Sorv. LAW § 63 (1) (McKinney 1955).
147. "[A] certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant
if it is found ... that the proposed service ... is or will
be required by the present or future public convenience and
necessity .... "
49 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964).
148. Maine Central Transportation Co., 10 P.U.R3d 489 (Maine
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1955).
149. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Hill, 243 Ore. 283, 413 P.2d 392 (1966).
150. Mulcahy v. Public Serv. Comnm'n, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298
(1941). See also Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 67 P.U.R. (ns.) 427
(1947) (necessity is not used in its lexicographical sense of indispensably
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court stated that convenience meant not indispensable but "reasonably requisite."1 51 The phrase has an interpretive gloss
(where separate statutory provisions do not expressly so provide) that consideration must be given to the possible impact of
decreased patronage on existing carriers. Perhaps the best statement of the various considerations involved in a determination
of public convenience and necessity was that given by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the first bus case decided under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935:
The question, in substance, is whether the new operation or
service will serve a useful public purpose, responsive to a public demand or need; whether this purpose can and will be served
as well by existing lines or carriers; and whether it can be
served by applicant with the new operation or service proposed
operations of existing
without endangering or impairing the
52
carriers contrary to the public interest.'
requisite); New England Greyhound Lines, Inc., 54 P.U.R. (n.s.) 498
(Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1944) ("reasonably necessary" is sufficient).
151. Abbot v. Public Util. Comm'n, 48 R.I. 196, 136 A. 490 (1927).
Other state definitional approaches to public convenience and necessity
follow a similar pattern:
[The word] "necessity" means a public need, without which
the public is inconvenienced to the extent of being handicapped in the pursuit of business or wholesome pleasure, or
both-without which the people generally of the community are
denied, to their detriment, that which is enjoyed by other people
generally, similarly situated.
Oklahoma Transp. Co. v. State, 198 Okla. 246, 177 P.2d 93 (1947), quoting from Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. State, 126 Okla. 48, 258 P. 874 (1927).
The statute does not require that the service be indispensable; it is
sufficient if the service is "needful and useful to the public ....
Eagle Bus Lines v. Illinois Comm. Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d 66, 119 N.E.2d
915 (1954).
Cf. San Diego & Colo. Ferry Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 210 Cal. 504, 511,
512, 292 P. 640, 643 (1930): "If it is of sufficient importance to warrant
the expense of making it, it is a public necessity. . . . A thing which is
Inconvenience may be so great as to
expedient is a necessity ....
A strong or urgent reason why a thing
amount to a necessity ....

should be done creates a necessity for doing it."
That all such "definitions" are of little use is also well recognized.
The phrase "must be construed and considered according to the whole
concept and purpose of the act. As to what constitutes 'public convenience and necessity' must fundamentally have references to the facts
and circumstances of each given case as it arises, as the term is not,
and was not intended to be, susceptible of precise definition." Utah
Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 103 Utah 459, 135 P.2d 915 (1943).
152. Pan American Bus Lines Operation, 1 M.C.C. 190, 203 (1936).
The rationale of the "public convenience and necessity" requirement in
federal legislation has been stated to be "to prevent interstate carriers
from weakening themselves by constructing or operating superfluous
lines and to protect them from being weakened by another carrier's
operating in interstate commerce a competing line not required in the
public interest." Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Northside Belt Ry., 276 U.S.
475, 479 (1928).
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a. "Adequacy"-The Conventional View. A finding that
the existing service is "adequate" is a complete negation of
"necessity" for the proposed service.153 This terminology unfortunately results in considerable conceptual confusion since
the two crucial conflicting factors, potential benefit from the
new service and potential economic harm to existing service
tend to be subsumed under the conclusory finding of "adequacy
of existing service."
The obfuscation of these central considerations typically
redounds to the benefit of existing carriers. What is unusual is
that this result is often enforced by the courts against an unwilling Commission. In Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v.
Bennet,154 the Utah Commission had certified an additional
carrier providing pick-up and delivery service for newspapers
and motion picture films. Although there was ample testimony
by potential customers of their desire for the frequent service ' 55
and although the Commission had not found that existing carriers would be adversely affected, the court reversed the grant of
authority, ruling that "public convenience and necessity" required a specific, affirmative showing and finding by the
commission that the existing service was in some way "inadequate.'

153.

1 56

Schmunk v. West Neb. Express, 159 Neb. 134, 65 N.W.2d 386

(1954).

154. 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958).
155. The court was not impressed by such evidence, reasoning:
Proving that public convenience and necessity would be served
by granting additional carrier authority means something more
than showing the mere generality that some members of the
public would like and on occasion use such type of transportation service. In any populous area it is easy enough to procure
witnesses who will say that they would like to see more frequent and cheaper service. Id. at 297, 333 P.2d at 1063.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has held that the testimony of four businessmen that they were dissatisfied with the speed of
existing service was not "substantial evidence" of existing service so
as to justify the authorization of a competitor. Campbell Sixty-Six
Express v. Delta Motor Line, 218 Miss. 198, 67 So. 2d 252 (1953).
156. Such a result would be required in some states where a finding of inadequacy of existing service is explicitly commanded by statute rather than by interpretation of "public convenience and necessity."
For example, in Seaboard Airline PMR. v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 779, 71
S.E.2d 146 (1952), the court distinguished ICC cases on the ground that
federal laws contained no provision like

VA. CODE

ANN.

§

56-281 (1950),

which specifically prohibited granting a certificate unless it was proved
that the existing carrier was providing inadequate service.
However, such statutory provisions tend to be interpreted to facilitate new certifications. See, e.g., State ex rel. North Carolina Util.
Comm'n v. Carolina Coach Co., 261 N.C. 384, 134 S.E.2d 689 (1964); Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 183, 83 S.E.2d 379
(1954).
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Such a restrictive attitude by court or Commission is common, but not universal. As the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
noted, "Protecting existing investments . . . from even wasteful
competition must be treated as secondary to the first and most
fundamental obligation of securing adequate service for the
public."'1 57 New Jersey courts similarly have refused to follow
the strict interpretation of "adequacy," ruling that disadvantages to existing carriers may only be weighed in the balance
58
against ultimate public advantages.
As pointed out earlier, the enactment of a "public interest"
standard for granting authority has been interpreted as a deliberate rejection of the protective "adequacy" rules associated
with the "public convenience and necessity" standard.'50 In addition, the Maryland Public Service Commission, in consideration,
among other factors, of the past and prospective economic growth
of the state, recently changed its policy in interpreting the statutory standard "public welfare and convenience" from one of
"regulated monopoly" to "regulated competition." The court approved both the change in stated policy and the result that adequacy of existing service was no longer a conclusive factor. 00
b. "Adequacy" and Pricing. The prices of the existing and
proposed services are typically ruled irrelevant to the question of
'adequacy of existing service" and hence irrelevant in a certification proceeding on the ground that the Commission has separate independent authority to assure that rates are just and reasonable.' 6 ' In jurisdictions where prices are relevant, the proposed lower rates must be proven compensatory and must have
a reasonable prospect of long-run stability.0 2 In any event, a
157. Breen v. Division of Pub. Util., 59 R.I. 134, 135, 194 A. 719, 720
(1937) quoting from 3 0. POND, PUBLIC UTILITIES § 746 (4th ed. 1932).

Accord, Pacific Southwest Airlines, 75 P.U.R.3d 508 (Calif. 1968).
158. See Application of Greenville Bus Co., 17 N.J. 131, 110 A.2d 122
(1954). Accord, Elk River Bus Co., 74 P.U.R. (n.s.) 503 (W. Va. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1948).

159. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
160. Maryland Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 253 Md. 618,
628-29, 253 A.2d 896, 902 (Md. Ct. App. 1969).

161. See, e.g., Fox, Application Nos. 3156-59, Decision No. 9707,
1937 P.U.R. Annual 55,217 (Colo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1937). But see
Maryland Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 253 A.2d 896 (Md. Ct.
App. 1969), where a Maryland statute expressly provided that in the
issuance of certificates of "public welfare and convenience" the commission should consider the rate to be charged.
§ 33(a) (1957).

MD. ANN. CODE art. 78,

162. Mountain Stage Line, Decision No. 45599, Application Nos.
31917 et al., 1951 P.U.R. Annual 222 (Cal. 1951). See also Service Gas
Co., 15 P.U.R. (n.s.) 202 (Pa. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1936).
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showing of lower prices alone is rarely sufficient to sustain a
grant of authority.0 3 It has been held, however, that although
rates should not ordinarily be considered as an element of
convenience and necessity, the Commission must consider them
where the proposed rates were as much as 46 percent under
16 4
those of existing carriers.
c. First Chance. Having determined that the existing service is in some manner inadequate, the question arises whether
the Commission should give the existing carrier an opportunity
to cure the inadequacy before certifying the application of a potential competitor. Some states provide by statute that the
existing carrier must be given a specified period to provide any
needed service. 6 5 Such statutes are designed to protect existing carriers from "undue and ruinous competition" from competitors who seek "to serve the same territory and thus deprive
them of that which was theirs, rightfully acquired under a previously granted certificate."' 1 0 There is considerable division
among the states as to the wisdom of first-chance rules, whether
established by statute or by interpretation of "public convenience and necessity."'167 Since the result of these rules is to give
the existing carrier the first chance without consideration of the
potential economic impact of certifying the applicant, their
only justification is some policy of "fairness" to existing carriers. A better solution is to leave to the Commission the discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the existing carrier should get a, "first chance."' 8 The possibility that a new
163. West Suburban Transp. Co. v. Chicago & W.L P.R., 309 Il. 87,
140 N.E. 56 (1923); Fornarotto v. Public Util. Comm'rs, 105 N.J.L 28, 143
A.T.L. 450 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
164. Airway Motor Coach Lines, 35 P.U.R. (ns.) 411 (Utah Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1940). In the case of traditional public utilities such as gas
and electric companies the applicant who offers lower rates is sometimes used to force lower rates from existing operators. See, e.g.,
Quinn, 8 P.U.R. (ns:) 134 (Colo. Pub. UtiL Comm'n 1935), where authority was granted to the present operator subject to the condition that
unless he should make effective the rates proposed by another applicant the latter's petition for operating authority would be reopened.
165. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 56-281 (1950).
166. Virginia Stage Lines v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 390, 397, 38
S.E.2d 576, 580 (1946).
167. Such rules exist in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, West Virginia and Virginia, while Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Utah, Wisconsin and federal authorities are to the contrary. See citations
in D. LocKLIN, EcoiqoMcs or TRANSPORTATION 694-95 (6th ed. 1966).
168. "Should such new service be rendered by existing carriers or
by the new applicant... [w]hich in the opinion of the commission will
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carrier may be certified provides both an incentive to existing
carriers to maintain and develop their service and encouragement to outsiders for the development of new ideas and service
techniques. 169
2.

Response to Innovation

The response of state Commissions and courts to proposals
for new or different transportation service has varied widely.
In a recent Nebraska case a bus company proposed to provide
an express service for passengers and some freight items between points presently served by a single carrier operating
only a local service. The Commission granted the application,
finding that public convenience and necessity required the
service and that the new operation was not likely to be detrimental to the existing service. 170 The declared statutory policy
was to promote "efficient service," without "undue preferences
or advantages, and unfair or destructive competitive practices.'

71

The court, however, stated:
The only reasonable effect of this would be to permit passengers and shippers of express ... a choice between transportation schedules ....
Since [protestant] operated over this
distance only local schedules ... which were slower than those
of [applicant], this would give rise to a conclusion that patrons
and shippers would ordinarily and reasonably resort to the
facilities of the [applicant] ....
These incidents could not well be considered as anything
less than unfair and destructive competition within the meaning
of the legal principles set forth herein. This is true since the
evidence discloses preponderantly that the facilities of [protestant] were good, the operating conditions satisfactory, and that
the capacity was more than sufficient....
It may well be said that the traffic situation . . . presented
elements of inconvenience, but not in the light of the evidence
of conditions and circumstance of true necessity as that
term
172
must be applied to common carriers or public highways.

The court accordingly vacated the grant of the certificate as
arbitrary and capricious. Not only was the existing carrier enbest subserve the public

convenience and necessity and welfare?"

In determining this issue the Commission was directed to consider the
effect on existing facilities, their investments and taxes, the effect on
the economic, industrial, social and intellectual life of the territory to
be served and the development of resources. Mulcahy v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 101 Utah 245, 261, 117 P.2d 298, 305 (1941).
169. D. HARPER, ECONomIc REGULATION OF THE MOTOR TRUCKING INDUSTRY 109-10 (1959).
170. Application of Greyhound Corp., 178 Neb. 9, 131 N.W.2d 664
(1964).
171. Id. at 14, 131 N.W.2d at 668.
172. Id. at 16-17, 131 N.W.2d at 669.
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titled to a first chance to provide adequate service, but the
"reasonable and necessary" interchanges and transfers of the
local service could not support a claim of inadequacy. Moreover, the duplication of lines of transportation would be authorized "only for compelling reasons."' 7 3
This incredibly restrictive interpretation-that existing "adequacy" must bar a new and different service-should be contrasted with the view taken by the Utah Supreme Court in
Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission. 74 There an applicant
who proposed only additional common carrier trucking service
was opposed by existing truckers and railroads. Taking the
view that the statute should be applied so as to encourage improvements in service, 75 the court sustained the grant of a
certificate stating:
To be adequate [the existing services] must safeguard the
people generally from appreciable inconvenience .... And ,
if a new or enlarged service will enhance the public welfare,
increase its opportunities, or stimulate its economic, social, intellectual or spiritual life to the extent that the patronage rethe expense of rendering it, the old service is
ceived will justify
not adequate.1 76
Greyhound and Mulcahy represent the extremes of state
policy on innovation. In the vast majority of states the policies are more ambiguous and their exposition less clearly articulated. Moreover, much of the judicial language can be seen as
surplusage, sustaining the Commission's exercise of discretion.
The occasional inconsistency of Commission policy statements
may be explained in part by the theory that state Commissions,
like the ICC,1 7 7 are result-oriented, the statement of policy being
an afterthought to the substantive decision on certification.
a. Inter-Modal Competition and Adequacy. The states
have naturally been most receptive to new applicants where the
differences in service were extreme-that is, in terms of traditional modal classifications of rail, water, land and air carriers.
Modal differences, based on an emphasis on the medium of travel,
are thus different in kind from service differences, for example,
173. Id. at 19, 131 N.W.2d at 670.
174. 101 Utah 245,117 P.2d 298 (1941).
175. Id. at 251, 117 P.2d at 300.
176. Id. at 252-53, 117 P.2d at 301 (emphasis added). This language was quoted with approval in Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 Wis. 59, 21 N.W.2d 5 (1945). The court in
Mulcahy was clearly going full steam, even to the extent of citing Marbury v. Madison for the independent power of the executive branch (the
Commission here).
177. See text accompanying notes 229-37 infra.
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as between taxi and street buses. Nevertheless, modal differences and "mere" service differences are both generalizations subject to continuing technological change. The futility
of viewing them as ultimate analytical tools for regulation seems
adequately demonstrated by hovercraft"78 and DAB, respectively.
It is instructive, nevertheless, to consider these modal competition cases, because DAB seems to be the "most different"
new service idea to appear in public passenger transportation
since buses began to compete seriously with street railways in
the 1920's. Moreover, the difficulties of urban public transportation systems today are analogous to the woes of the dying
street railways at that time.
In these terms, the best state court decision construing
"public convenience and necessity" in the context of a new mode
of transportation is a 1929 Virginia case 179 where an electric
railway contested the award of a certificate to a motor bus
company. The court said:
The ability to carry in some manner all who apply for passage is not necessarily the touchstone. .

.

.

[I]t is sufficient if

there is a public demand for bus service in preference to other
means of transportation. When people generally wish to travel
in this way, they should be permitted to do so, and it is no sufficient answer to say that other carriers,
in other ways, stand
ready to give the necessary service. 180
The court recognized that the railway was in serious financial

difficulty, receipts having steadily decreased since the end of
World War I. The court reasoned, however, that these difficulties were due in part to the increasing competition of private
cars, and "[t] he promise of relief depends upon the growth of
Hopewell, to which easy flow of traffic must always . . . con-

tribute."' 8 ' Virginia policy had not been to2 curtail competition;
8
the railroad investors "took their chances":
178. Sarisky, The Law and an Unprecedented Mode of Transportation: The Hovercraft, 16 J. OF PUB. LAW 138 (1967).
179. Petersburg, Hopewell & City Point Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth
ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 152 Va. 193, 146 S.E. 292, 67 A.L.R. 931
(1929). This case is distinguishable from ordinary application of the
"public convenience and necessity standard" because it involved a
Virginia statute providing that the existence of a carrier in a territory
would not alone be sufficient cause to deny a certificate but could be
considered in limiting the number of vehicles the applicant could offer.
Id. at 203, 146 S.E. at 294, 67 A.L.R. at 935.
180. Id. at 205, 146 S.E. at 295, 67 A.L.R. at 936.
181. Id. at 202, 146 S.E. at 294, 67 A.L.R. at 935.
182. Motor vehicle operators had to acquire certificates but under
Virginia laws, unlike federal law after 1920, railroads were free to
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We have to concede that, in industrial development, the law
of the survival of the fittest is not to be gainsaid. Stage coaches
dnd canals were in many instances a total loss, made so by railroads, which in their turn clashed with interurban electric lines,
and now both are facing the automobile in its varied fo
....
Should the time come when airplanes are preferred by a substantial part of the public, this preference, in its turn, will have
to be heeded. They, too, will have then become a necessary
public convenience, not to be put aside because buses can carry
all who wish to go.' 83
Substantially the same line of reasoning was followed by a
New Jersey court in 1935.184 The opinion pointed out that the
proposed bus service was of a different character than that afforded by the railroad, concluding that "if railroads 'are entitled
as public utilities to protection against destructive competition,
it should be a competition with a service which they have been

giving.'

"3185

Similarly, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service
Commission,8 " the Utah Supreme Court sustained the grant of
authority to a motor common carrier of goods against the railroad's argument that its own service was "adequate." Empha18 7
sizing the flexible door-to-door service offered by the trucker,
the opinion relied on the same sort of historical developmental
principle as did the Virginia court in Petersburg:
[C]onvenience and necessity are found, and consist largely, in
the changing conditions and demands of the times. There was
a time when the covered wagon, river scow, and pony express
fairly well served the public needs, but as they became inadequate there arose a need for railroad facilities. So too a railroad
may function well as railroad transportation and yet in the very
nature
of things not adequately serve the need of the commu88

nity.1

3.

Encouraging Innovation, Less Than Modal Differences, and
Arguments for DAB
The leading state case on the need to encourage innova-

parallel each other as they wished. Id. at 202, 146 S.E. at 294, 67 A.LR.
at 935.
183. Id. at 206, 146 S.E. at 295-96, 67 A.L.R. at 937.
184. West Shore R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 13 N.J. Misc.
180, 177 A. 93 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 116 N.JJ. 191, 183 A. 180 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1935).
185. 13 N.J. Mllisc. at 182, 177 A. at 94.
186. 103 Utah 459, 135 P.2d 915 (1943).
187. For examples of willingness to assess modal advantages and
disadvantages in contexts other than certification see Chicago R. v.
Commerce Comm'n ex rel. C.M.C. Co., 336 Mll.
51, 167 N.E. 840 (1929);
City of Bayonne v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 126 N.J.L. 396, 19
A.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
188. 103 Utah at 465-66, 135 P.2d at 918.
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tion is Motor Transport Co. v. Public Service Commission.'8
The case itself was addressed, strangely enough, only to the
need for competitive, identical common motor carrier service in
order to encourage improvements, so that everything it says
about innovation applies a fortiori where the applicant is presently offering a different service. In reply to the protestant's
argument that any inadequacy could be cured by order, the Commission said:
Service orders cannot take the place of management initiative or require the exercise of such initiative in experimentation and service improvements designed to follow closely the
changing current of traffic needs. Management alone can pio-

neer this field and create a service which is above minimum
standards and better even than "reasonably adequate."' 9 0
While the Commission had earlier adopted a conventional
"adequacy" interpretation of the statute, and it was conceded
by all that the existing carriers were giving "reasonably adequate" service so that a service complaint could not be prosecuted against it, the court nevertheless sustained the administrative ruling that the existing service "has failed to meet the
test of the public interest and public convenience and necessity
in this broader sense .

.

. .""

The court took the view that the

statute did not create any presumption for or against monopoly
or competition, 192 so that the Commission was free to choose
193
which would best serve the public interest.
Some state courts, at certain times, have made encouragingly strong statements in favor of different service, even
though of the same mode as the existing service. In Mulcahy v.
Public Service Commission, for example, the court said:
The statute should be so construed and applied as to encourage

rather than retard mechanical and other improvements in appliances and in the quality of the service rendered the public. ..

189.
190.

191.

.194

263 Wis. 31, 56 N.W.2d 548 (1953).
Id. at 36, 56 N.W.2d at 550.

Id. at 39, 56 N.W.2d at 551.

The court in an earlier opinion

had cited the extremely liberal standard in the Union Pacific Railroad
case. See text accompanying note 186 supra.
192. Some state courts had apparently taken the view that statutes
requiring certificates for operation were based on a theory of "regulated
monopoly." But see Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 103 Utah
459, 466, 135 P.2d 915, 918 (1943) ("regulated competition is as much
within the provisions of the act as is regulated monopoly").
193. However, one of the statutory duties of the Commission was to
"prevent unnecessary duplication of service." 263 Wis. at 37, 56 N.W.2d
at 551. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 194.18 (1957).
194. 101 Utah 245, 251, 117 P.2d 298, 300 (1941). The statement was
made in the context of a proposal for merely "additional" service. See
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Beyond statements of policy, there seems to be rather general
agreement that whatever "adequacy of existing service" may
mean, it means less where the proposed service has distinctive
characteristics. Commissions and courts in certification proceedings commonly discount existing adequacy when they distinguish between local and through service,') 5 common carrier and
express service' 98 and livery service and route buses.' 9 ' Moreover, it has been suggested (with direct application to DAB) as
a general principle that the doctrine of adequacy must apply
less strictly to any irregular route transportation service, even
though the proposed and existing services are identical. 9 8 The
corollary that prices are irrelevant in a certification proceeding
is clearly inapplicable where the service is different, and a rate
differential itself, if sufficiently large, may result in a "different service."'199
It should be noted that this approach to adequacy may apply
even though the existing transit system is operated by a public
authority. In a recent California case2 0 the court held that the
Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority statute did not preclude the Public Utilities Commission from certifying a special
bus service from a limited number of pickup points to the Dodger
also Kansas Transp. Co. v. State Corp. Comn'n, 202 Kan. 103, 105, 446
P.2d 766, 769 (1968) ("It is sufficient to show that the existing service is
not of such a type or character which satisfies the public need and convenience .

. .");

Petersburg, Hopewell & City Point Ry. v. Common-

wealth ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 152 Va. 193, 203, 146 S.E. 292, 295,
67 A.L.R. 931, 935 (1929) ("When more convenient and adequate service
is offered to the public it would seem that necessity requires such public
convenience should be served.").
195. Bartonville Bus Line v. Eagle Motor Coach Line, 326 Ill. 200,
157 N.E. 175 (1927). Accord, Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 68 Cal. 2d 406, 438 P.2d 801, 67 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
196. In re United Parcel Service, Inc., 256 A.2d 443 (Me. 1969).
197. Dion v. Public Util. Comm'n, 24 Conn. Supp. 403, 192 A.2d 46
(Sup. Ct. 1963).
198. See, e.g., Application of Young, 171 Neb. 784, 789-90, 107 N.W.2d
752, 756 (1961):
While the... [adequacy doctrine] would apply rather strictly
to cases involving applications for authority to operate buses
within a city or in regular route service between cities and generally to regular route freight lines, it would, however, have
very limited authority to operate irregular route authority.
See also Northern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 69 Wash.
2d 472, 418 P.2d 735 (1966).
199. Airway Motor Coach Lines, 35 P.U.R. (ns.) 411 (Utah Pub.
Serv. Comnm'n 1940). See also Louisiana-Nevada Transit Co., 30 P.U.R.
(n.s.) 40 (F.P.C. 1939).
200. Los Angeles Metro. Transit Auth. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 52
Cal. 2d 655, 343 P.2d 913 (1959).
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baseball park if "public convenience and necessity" so required. 20 1
The certification was sustained on the grounds that the area and
its transportation system were still growing and developing, that
the authority was not yet ready to supply all the service that
might be required, especially of a specialized variety, and that
the private carrier, unlike the authority, would not be hampered
20 2
by statutory geographical restrictions.
Finally, a "first chance" interpretive rule should not apply
when the proposed service is significantly different from existing
service since the existing carrier is likely to lack the equipment,
knowledge and desire to provide the different service. For this
20
same reason, the question has been raised only seldom.

3

Sim-

ilarly, first chance statutes have been held not applicable where
the proposed service is different.

20 4

The proposition that a Commission must weigh the public
benefits likely to follow from a proposed new service against the
probability and seriousness of the impact on existing services in
assessing "public convenience and necessity" seems on its face entirely correct and entirely obvious. Nevertheless, some courts
still reject this view. 20 5 The backwardness of the transportation
industry generally and the fact that the motor carrier passenger
industry has been almost entirely free of major innovations indi201. The result of course depends on the statute involved. The
California statute did not speak in explicit terms of exclusive authority for the public body. Compare the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority statute, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 161 A, § 3 (1970) entitled "Addi-

tional Powers" [: I "(i) To provide mass transportationservice, whether
directly, jointly or under contract, on an exclusive basis ....
" (emphasis added).
202. However, to the extent that DAB serves a pick-up and distribution function supplemental to a scheduled route service, efficiency
considerations alone suggest that the route carrier should get first
chance to provide the coordinated service.
The ICC, for example, has always been receptive to the claims of
railroads to provide their own pick-up and delivery motor service.
Thus, in Missouri Pac. R.R., Extension of Operations, 41 M.C.C. 241, 243,
the Commission granted such a railroad application:
[W]e believe it to be neither the policy of Congress nor the
proper function of the Commission to retard any form of progress in transportation which will serve the public interest.
Public convenience and necessity require the increased economy,
frequency and flexibility resulting from the coordinated service in such a case.
203. See, e.g., West Bros. v. H & L Delivery Service, Inc., 220 Miss.
323, 70 So. 2d 870 (1954).
204. Corporation Comm'n v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 54 Ariz. 159,
94 P.2d 443 (1939); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 9
Ohio 2d 187, 224 N.E.2d 761 (1967).
205. See, e.g., Application of Greyhound Corp., 178 Neb. 9, 131 N.W.
2d 664 (1964), discussed at text accompanying notes 170-73 supra.
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cates that state regulatory commissions are apt to be even less

receptive. The problem is complicated by the fact that the statutory basis of regulation in many states has not been revised in
many decades.20 6
It appears, therefore, that the primary task of a DAB applicant is to convince the administrative body of the worth of the
developmental approach 207 illustrated in the preceding section.
If the theory can be established, it can then be shown that DAB
could fill the gap in public transportation between high cost individualized service by taxis and inflexible route service by existing transit systems. The applicant could argue that this gap
has become increasingly important with the progressive dispersal
of urban areas, the continuing trend toward suburban industrial
locations with resulting suburb-suburb trip demand patterns, and
the growing pressure to restrict the use of private autos in urban
areas.
B.

PERsPEcTIVEs FROM THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE

1.

Use of Competitionto Induce Service Improvements

The Interstate Commerce Commission has long held the belief that one of the major ways to develop new and improved
passenger service is to encourage strong competition among carriers. To this end it has often received favorably proposals for
new types of service. For example, in Pan American Bus Lines
208
Operation,
the first bus case decided under the Motor Carrier
Act of 1935, the applicant proposed an expansion of its New
York-Miami service. The company provided free pillows, icewater and porters who doubled as tour guides. In addition, no
change of buses was required and baggage was checked only
once. The service also featured stops at several tourist attractions en route. Pan American contended on this evidence that
206. For example, the hearing examiner for the Rhode Island Department of Public Utilities is of the opinion that no irregular route passenger
carrier other than taxis could be certified under existing Rhode Island law. His department's rules and regulations are presently being
revised for the first time since 1923. Interview with Mr. Riley, hearing
examiner, Rhode Island Department of Public Utilities, in Providence,
R.I., Aug. 29, 1969.
207. "The necessity to be provided for is not only the existing urgent need, but the need to be expected in the future, so far as may be
anticipated from the development of the community, the growth of
industry, the increase in wealth and population, and all the elements
to be expected in the progress of a community." Campbell v. Illinois
Comm. Comm'n, 334 Ill. 293, 296, 165 N.E. 790, 792 (1929).
208. 1 MC.C. 190 (1936).
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it had tapped a new market and that 70 percent of its passengers
formerly traveled by means other than common carrier motor
vehicle. 20 9 The Commission agreed that Pan American's traffic
was largely "newly created traffic rather than business taken
from other carriers" and that the application involved "a new
and distinctive form of service, better adapted to long distance
through service than that which protestants had theretofore
maintained ...."210 (A DAB-type operation could of course
make closely analogous arguments with respect to its impact on
route-buses and rail transit on the one hand and taxis on the
other.) In answer to the objection that the Commission should
require existing carriers to provide any additional "necessary"
service prior to granting certificates to new carriers, the Commission replied, "[p] ublic regulation can enforce what may be called
reasonable standards of safe, continuous, and adequate service,
but it can hardly be expected to take the initiative in experimentation and the development of new types of service."2'1
The
Commission stated that the grant of certification was influenced
by its view that the motor bus service was a "new and developing
industry" and that the operation would "in any event serve a
useful experimental purpose." 212 In Santa Fe Trails Stages,
Inc.,21 3 the ICC reiterated its concern with fostering new and improved passenger service and stated its working principle that
effective competition was a necessary precondition of that goal.
The Commission there granted certification to a competing bus
line, reasoning that "[r] egulated monopoly is not a complete substitute for competition. The latter fosters research and experimentation and induces refinements in service which are not
likely otherwise to be accomplished. ' 2 1 4 The Commission came
very close to establishing a presumption that a service which
faced no competition could not be "adequate," saying, "we
might very reasonably say that where there is ample traffic a
dominant existing service without any effective competition is
not all that experience has taught that the public needs for its
2
best interests and consequently is not an adequate service.11 15
The results of both these cases however, and the strong Commission language used therein must be seen in the light of the
209. Id. at 193.
210. Id. at 208.

211. Id. (emphasis added).
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 210.
21 M.C.C. 725 (1940).
Id. at 748.
Id.
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dominant factor of the intercity motor-bus industry-the Greyhound Corporation. The Commission, in response not only to
Greyhound's overwhelming size relative to its competitors but
also to its extremely aggressive competitive tactics, 210 has always been receptive to competitive applications. Nevertheless,
the Commission also has decided in favor of a proposed competitive service when Greyhound was not involved, even when the
217
protesting carrier was operating at a deficit.
The Commission's policy of encouraging competition to induce service improvements, while said to be most pronounced in
bus cases,2 18 is certainly not limited to that field, as "[i] t has
been [the Commission's] view that in order to develop a healthy
transportation system in a territory, a certain degree of competition should be encouraged."2 19
Such language accords with the fact that the ICC, unlike
some state commissions, has never felt bound by a "first chance"
rule that existing carriers should be accorded an opportunity to
provide any additional service found to be required by public
convenience and necessity.22 0 The federal courts have con216.
TRIEs:

See, e.g., C.

FuLDA, COMPET=ON 3Iq THE REGULATED INDUS-

TRANsPORTATcON 88-89

(1961):

There was also a second-class cut-rate service run with obsolete equipment by Dollar Lines, a Greyhound subsidiary,
from San Francisco to Portland, and by Independent Stages, a
North Coast subsidiary, from Portland to Seattle, and return.
Both were maintained by their parent corporations "solely as
fighting ships wherewith to meet and discourage competition."
The methods adopted in pursuit of these objectives included
insufficient schedules and intentional crowding; people were
told that they could not buy tickets, ticket holders were refused passage and advised to wait or go over to Greyhound,
reservations were not honored, employees were discourteous,
baggage was misplaced.
The situation Fulda describes led to West Coast Bus Lines, Ltd.,
Common Carrier Application, 41 M.C.C. 269 (1942), rev'g 32 M.C.C. 619
(1942), dismissed sub nom. North Coast Transp. Co. v. United States, 54
F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 323 U.S. 668 (1944).
217. Norfolk S. Bus Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va.),
affd per curiam, 340 U.S. 802 (1950). However, this case is distinguishable because it involved not an ordinary route-extension application
but the lifting of a "closed door" restriction on existing operations
which "could be justified only in unusual circumstances." Moreover,
it was not shown that the protestant's deficit was associated with this
particular route.
218. See C. FULDA, supra note 216.
219. Associated Transports, Inc., Extension-Kansas, 54 L.C.C. 528,
529 (1952). Accord, Balch & Martin Motor Express, Common Carrier
Application, 47 M.C.C. 75, 78 (1947).
220. See, e.g., Auclair Transp., Inc. v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 328
(D. Mass. 1963), affd per curiam, 376 U.S. 514 (1964) (the Commission's
opinion in Aucair is Railway Express Agency, Inc., Extension-Nashua,
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sistently sustained the Commission's view that certification of
additional carriers was a permissible alternative to enforcing the
duty of existing carriers to provide adequate service. In Davidson Transfer and Storage Co. v. United States,221 the Commission
had found that refrigerated truck service between New York
and Washington was repeatedly delayed or improperly refrigerated, particularly with regard to small shipments. The court affirmed the Commission's certification of an additional carrier,
saying:
We think that one of the weapons in the Commission's
arsenal is the right to authorize competition where it is necessary in order to compel adequate service .... The conception
that the public must wait while the Commission exercises its
statutory powers fortified by orders of court, to compel existing
carriers to do what they should do, is one which does
not com222
mend itself to common sense and the public interest.

While the Commission may seem to have adopted a protective attitude, especially toward railroads and other common carriers of goods, in recent years, the courts have generally been
hostile to any tendencies away from competitive goals. In
Nashua Motor Express, Inc. v. United States,223 the court reversed the Commission's denial of a certificate to a potentially
competitive common carrier trucker, reasoning that the Commission was incorrect in relying on adequacy of existing service and
in failing to consider other essential elements of "public convenience and necessity" such as the desirability of competition, improved service and different kinds of service. The court took
the position that the Commission had established a rule of law
that inadequacy of existing service was a necessary element to
any grant of certification. "While there is some authority for
this view .. .we feel that the better rule is embodied in the
'224
more numerous cases to the contrary.
N.H., 91 M.C.C. 311 (1962) ); Lang Transp. Corp. v. United States, 75 F.
Supp. 915 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
221. 42 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1941, as amended Jan. 8, 1942), afj'd
per curiam, 317 U.S. 587 (1942).
222. 42 F. Supp. at 219, 220.
223. 230 F. Supp. 646 (D.N.H. 1964).
224. Id. at 652. Accord, Younger Bros. v. United States, 289 F. Supp.
545 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
Federal administrative decisions emphasizing the importance of developing new kinds of service to meet future needs are not limited
to the Interstate Commerce Commission. American Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB, 192 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1951) was a controversy over the CAB's
certification of four air carriers of property only. At the time there
were no cargo-only air carriers, and the project involved new aircraft
design, new promotion methods, new arrangements of schedules, etc.
Id. at 420. Although the intervening combination carriers argued
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2. New or Different Service, Intermodal Competition and the
"Adequacy" Doctrine.
The reasoning of the cases in the preceding section, that
certifications should be granted in order to establish competition
which will then induce service improvements, of course suggests
that, a fortiori, where a new service such as DAB is already in
existence and being presently offered by an applicant, the existing service can not be "adequate."
The Supreme Court endorsed this line of reasoning in United
States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc.,2 25 by sustaining the

Commission's finding of "inadequacy" of present service where
the present service involved interchanges and the applicant proposed to operate a single through line service.
Moreover, whatever importance might be assigned to the adequacy of existing service, it was clear that the factor carried
least weight where the potential competitor was another mode.
In Alabama Great Southern Ry. v. United States,2 2 0 a water carrier applied for authority to carry loaded railroad box cars between Savannah and other ports.2 2 7

The protesting railroads

asserted the adequacy of rail service to Savannah. The court
that the factual evidence of record would not justify the certification of

any all-cargo carriers, the CAB, relying largely on its own expertise,
concluded that there was "an existing potential domestic traffic for air
freight of not less than one billion ton-miles annually." Id. at 422.
The court rejected the combination carriers' argument that the Board
could look only to the evidence of record to justify the certificate, quoting with approval from the Board's opinion:
[W]e cannot agree with the contention that the issue of public
convenience and necessity in the present case is to be resolved
solely on the basis of past and current facts.... Our decision
must also take into account ... broad considerations of future
welfare related to the development of a new type of air commerce which until a comparatively recent time has received
little attention. Id. at 421.
Similarly, in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 73 P.U.R.3d 1 (F.P.C.
1968), the Federal Power Commission granted a certification of public
convenience and necessity to construct high-capacity pipeline facilities
for the transportation of off-shore gas even though they assumed that
such gas, not yet attached, could be made available only at prices
higher than those at which gas could presently be purchased on shore,
finding that early developments of the off-shore reserves and their
attendant transportation facilities was in the public interest.
225. 327 U.S. 515 (1946).
226. 103 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Va. 1952).
227. Although this case involved an application and certification
of temporary authority, the court asserted that "[e]xistence of other
service is but one element to be considered. In this regard reason allows
no distinction between temporary and permanent certificates." Id.
at 227.
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sustained the grant of certification, ruling that water carriers
could not be foreclosed merely because there were existing motor,
rail or air carriers "physically capable" of providing service. The
existence of other service was only one element to be considered:
Perhaps there may be circumstances in which the presence of transportation other than water carriage can be found
to satisfy every need. But certainly it cannot be so held until
the National purpose to foster a merchant marine, the Nation's
policy to develop and preserve "a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail", and the area's reliance upon
the water to provide it employment and industry as well as
transportation, especially carriage of the kind afforded peculiarly
by ships, have been weighed and discarded as unattainable or
simply transportation, is the stipuimpracticable. Service,
228 not
lation of the statute.
The confusion and difficulty experienced by the Commission
in attempting to adapt the adequacy of existing service test in a
multimodal context, as well as the resulting vacillation, can be
seen in a case arising soon after the Alabama case. In A. J. Metler Extension,229 the Stauffer Chemical Co. had built a plant at
Lowland, Tennessee, 50 miles from Knoxville, for the production
of sulfur-based chemical products. The crude sulfur used by the
plant originated in Louisiana and was moved to Knoxville by
barge, thence to the plant at Lowland by railroad cars. The
applicant, A.J. Metler, proposed to build his own dock facility at
Knoxville and transport the sulfur by dumptruck-type vehicles
from there to the plant. Stauffer and Metler introduced evidence
of several advantages of the motor carrier operation. For example, the trucks could dump the sulfur directly into process, thus
eliminating the need for large storage facilities and extra handlings necessitated by rail service. The motor carrier vehicles
could arrive continually while rail shipments tended to arrive in
large blocks of cars at a time. The plant's rail spur and storage
facilities were not adequate to accommodate the numbers of cars
and the volume of sulfur thus involved. Finally, the trucks could
arrive more predictably. The transit time of individual rail cars
for the 50 mile trip had varied from one to ten days, thus necessitating keeping rented unloading cranes and other equipment on
hand for indefinite periods.
Division 5 of the Commission apparently found that there
was "no convincing evidence on this record that the [rail carriers] . ..would not meet the shipper's reasonable transporta228.

229.

Id.

62 M.C.C. 143 (1953) (second report on reconsideration).
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tion requirements."2 30 Upon reconsideration, the full Commission affirmed the division's conclusion stating that Stauffer's
preference for the motor service was "predicated upon its 'desire' to obtain reduced transportation costs and to promote certain operating efficiencies in its plant rather than upon a showing
of any real deficiency in the transportation service offered by
existing [rail] carriers. 2 31
The two major deficiencies of the "adequacy of existing service test" in a multimode context were thus glaringly revealed.
First, there is no common denominator on which to assess the
"adequacy" of existing service against a proposed different service. It is not surprising, therefore, that "adequacy" becomes only
a conclusory label, reflecting the decision that the certification
will not be granted. Second, the Commission in administering
the "adequacy" test in numerous cases involving only one mode
had applied the conventional doctrine that prices of the proposed
and existing service were irrelevant in a certification proceeding.23 2 This doctrine made perfectly good sense in that context
since the Commission had separate power to assure that rates
were just and reasonable..2 33 Moreover, it seems entirely reasonable for the Commission to adopt such a doctrine on the grounds
that it would be very unlikely that an applicant desiring to provide the same service as existing carriers with the same types of
equipment would be willing or able in the long run to live up to
his claims in a certification proceeding that he would offer significantly lower rates. These justifications of the doctrine are
wholly inapplicable in a multimode situation.
From this report, on reconsideration referred to above, Metler filed an appeal in the federal district court. After the Justice
Department indicated some uncertainty that the decision could
be successfully defended, the Commission issued a second report
on reconsideration. Upon the same record the Commission
granted the certificate, citing its duty under the National Transportation Policy to preserve the inherent advantages of each
230. Id. at 149 (dissenting opinion). The division 5 decision, without
opinion, is noted at 53 M.C.C. 823.

231. 61 MLC.C. 335, 340 (1952) (first report on reconsideration).
232. For example, the comparative level of rate structures cannot be
considered as a basis for denial of authority sought any more than it
could be so considered in support of a grant of authority. Freight
Transit Co., Extension, 78 M.C.C. 427, 432 (1958).

233. "f the sole dissatisfaction stems from the belief that rates of
existing carriers are unjust or unreasonable, appropriate relief is available under other provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act." Carl
Subler Trucking, Inc., Extension, 77 M.C.C. 707, 713 (1958).
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mode 23 4 and finding upon reexamination that it was in fact impractical for Stauffer to use the railroad and that "in the circumstances here present the rail service is insufficient and inadequate reasonably to meet the shipper's need .... ",235
Nevertheless, the Commission strove mightily to preserve
the traditional adequacy concept stating:
Given a limited amount of traffic and an existing carrier of
whatever mode which needs it more or less urgently, the question whether a competing service shall be authorized turns upon
the question as 236
to the relative or comparative adequacy of the
existing service.
Thus the Commission attempted to subsume the factor of eco-

nomic impact on the existing carrier, an important but separate
consideration, under the overburdened rubric of adequacy. Similarly, it gave lip service to the associated doctrine of price irrelevancy saying only that "[a]lthough costs definitely are not the
controlling consideration influencing the shipper, the overall cost
of the proposed barge-motor movement would be somewhat
lower than either barge-rail or all-rail ....
237 The Commission

had thus succeeded in delaying a fullscale judicial test of the
"adequacy" doctrine for a few more years-until 1957.
3. Erosion of the Adequacy Doctrine and its Price-is-Irrelevant
Corollary by the Higher FederalCourts
Despite the relatively unrestrictive attitude of the Commission toward the certification of competitive passenger service illustrated by such cases as Pan American Lines and Santa Fe
Trails Stages, it maintained a very protective stance with regard

to common carriers of property, as illustrated by the Metler case.
This difference in policy seems to result from a set of factors.
Most important, one purpose of economic regulation of the motor

carrier industry has been to protect the railroads, 238 not only by
restrictions on entry but also by minimum rate regulation. The
railroads have of course not desired to be protected from the loss

of their passenger traffic-quite the contrary. A second major
reason for promoting passenger carriage competition is the overriding domination of the industry structure by Greyhound.
Moreover, the intercity motor carrier passenger industry has
234.
235.
236.
237.

See note preceding 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1959).
62 M.C.C. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 147 (emphasis added).

238.

See A.

REGuLATION

FRIEDLAENDER, THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION

(1969); D. Locnm, supra note 167, at 666.
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been expanding so rapidly, due in part to the railroad default and
the resulting captive market, that entry restrictions have not
been necessary to preserve the stability of existing firms. Finally, the Commission may have been more responsive to competitive and innovative pressures in the passenger carriage industry simply because the political impact, in terms of persons directly affected, is much greater.
The cases discussed in this section trace the federal courts'
attack on these protective attitudes toward transportation of
goods. This development is very important for two reasons. The
federal regulatory analogy to the situation of a DAB applicant
before a state regulatory commission is not the bus-line application for competitive intercity authority but the common property carrier application which threatens the railroad service. In
each case there is an existing carrier providing an essential service to a more or less captive traffic; the existing urban transit
lines, like the railroads and unlike intercity buses, are experiencing traffic declines and usually are operating at a deficit, often
with public subsidy. The DAB applicant offers not a similar, directly competitive service but a faster, more flexible, door-todoor service at significantly different prices-precisely the virtues offered by motor vehicle common carriers of goods as compared to railroads. Therefore one can expect the concerns and
reactions of regulatory bodies to a DAB application to be very
similar to those of the ICC to a motor common carrier of property
application opposed by the railroads. More importantly, these
cases provide the only instances in which the federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, have considered in any depth the adequacy and price-is-irrelevant rules as analytical and regulatory
concepts.
The Metier case, as pointed out above, had revealed the major difficulties of these doctrines. Their use in that kind of intermodal property carriage context finally came up for consideration in Schaffer TransportationCo. v. United States.2 30 Schaffer
applied for a certificate to transport granite by truck from points
in South Dakota and Vermont. Only rail service was presently
available between all the points sought to be served by Schaffer.
Division 5 of the Commission granted the certificate, relying on
testimony by shippers that the truck service would produce
fewer delays and allow them to expand their markets and sales,
ship faster and maintain lower inventories. It was common
239. 355 U.S. 83 (1957).
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practice for the shippers to hold back and consolidate shipments
of less than a carload so that they could take advantage of the
lower carload rates. The shippers were also eager to equalize the
competitive disadvantage they suffered compared to other gran240
ite producers who did have truck service.
The full Commission, however, reconsidered and with four
members dissenting, denied the application finding that the only
real deficiency of rail service warranted by the record was that
it was too slow. And this delay was the fault of the shippers'
own action in delaying small shipments in order to get the lower
rates. The Commission's decision was a conventional statement
of the "adequacy" concept:
We have carefully considered applicant's arguments to the

contrary, but are forced to conclude that the service presently
available is reasonably adequate.

The evidence indicates that

the witnesses' main purpose in supporting the application is to
obtain lower rates rather than improved service. It is well established that this is not a proper basis for a grant of authority ....241
The Supreme Court felt that the Commission had fallen from
grace since the final Metier report and quoted language from
that decision to the effect that "relative or comparative adequacy" of the existing service was the significant consideration
when competitive goals were being accommodated with stability
goals. 242 In a terse opinion by Chief Justice Warren, it then exploded both major tenets of the adequacy doctrine, ruling that
the Commission had failed to give weight to the "inherent advantages" of the truck service, contravening the direction in the
National Transportation Policy to administer the Interstate Commerce Act so as to "recognize and preserve the inherent advantages" of each mode, 243 and that rates could never be irrelevant
in an intermodal competition situation since "[t] he ability of one
mode of transportation to operate with a rate lower than competing types of transportation is precisely the sort of 'inherent
advantage' that the congressional policy requires the Commission
to recognize.

' 24 4

There are two primary reasons why this rationale justifying
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
declaration

at
at
at
at
at
of

86.
89.
90.
89.
91. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the
policy conveyed "a most generalized point of view"

so that the decision did not violate those standards given the "massive
experience" to be attributed to the Commission in this case. Id. at 94, 95.
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certification of a new or different service would be of limited
usefulness to a DAB type operation seeking certification from a
state commission. First, the Supreme Court was able to rely on
the statutory direction to "recognize and preserve the inherent
advantages" of each mode. While some states have a very similar
policy declaration, 45 most do not. That language was only added
to the federal statute in 1940,2 4 so there has been little opportunity for the usual duplication process at the state level. Nevertheless, although a number of states, such as Alabama and
New Jersey, have no statutory transportation policy at all, most
have language calling for a "balanced," "most efficient" or "coordinated" transportation system,2 -4 7 on the basis of which an applicant could make arguments analogous to those in Schaffer.
The second major reason for Schaffer's limited usefulness is
that it was a case of clear modal competition. While there seems
to have been little administrative or judicial thought given to
the definition of "mode," it is generally assumed that there are
only four-rail, motor, water and air.2 4 S Thus, while a DAB
applicant would have such significant differences from conventional motor passenger carriers that the policy of deemphasizing
the adequacy of existing service would seem fully applicable,
such an approach would have little support in a policy declaration in terms of "modes." A few states, however, have policies
even more favorable to a DAB applicant than the federal statute,
advantages "among carsince they speak of preserving inherent
2 -49
riers," with no limitation to modes.
These difficulties with using the Sclaffer rationale have
been alleviated, however, by several cases decided since then. In
ICC v. J-T Transport Co.,2 50 the Commission had denied a motor
contract permit on the ground that the applicant had failed to
prove the inadequacy of existing common carrier motor services.
The opinion of the Court, focusing on the statutory definition of
a contract carrier as one who inter alia meets the "distinct need
245. See, e.g.,' IND. ANN.
LAw § 63-i(1)

STAT.
(McKinney 1955).

§ 47-1214 (1966); N.Y. Pus. SERv.

246. See note preceding 49 U.S.C:A. § 1 (1959).
247. E.g., LA. Bsv. STAT. § 45.161 (1950); ME. Rsv. STAT. A~Nw. Ut. 35,
§§ 1551 & 1555 (1964); MIcH. CoMv. LAws ANN. § 475.2 (1966); Miss. CODE
AxN. § 7633 (1956).
248. See Reddish v. ICC, 368 U.S. 81, 135 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
249. See, e.g., ARm STAT. ANN. § 73-1755 (1947); ILL ANN. STAT.
ch. 95-1/2, § 282.1 (Smith-Hurd 1958); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281.590
(1963).

250.

368 U.S. 81 (1961).
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of each individual customer, ' 251 reversed on the ground that the
Commission was thus unwarranted in placing on the applicant
the burden of proof as to inadequacy of the existing services. 2 2
Moreover, the Commission was similarly unwarranted in indulging the presumption that the services of the existing carriers
would be adversely affected by the loss of "potential" traffic,
where they had not handled that traffic before. 25 83 The relation
of a DAB operation to existing passenger carriers is closely analogous to the relationship between contract and common carriers
in this case. Although a DAB applicant in most instances
would be classified a common carrier because it would be willing
to provide its services to anyone who requested them and although J-T Transport is distinguishable because of the particular
federal statutes involved, he could argue that the new, distinctive nature of the service and the fact that many of its customer
trips would be newly generated rather than siphoned from the
traffic of existing carriers should relieve him of the burden of
proving the inadequacy of existing service and that in any event
"adequacy of existing service" should be less important where
the proposed service is significantly different.
With regard to the "price-is-irrelevant" doctrine the Court
went further. In the companion case, ICC v. Reddish, 25 4 the
Commission had denied a contract carrier permit on the conventional ground that the shippers' primary desire was for lower
rates. The Court ruled, quoting from Schaffer, that the rates
were a factor entitled to weight in determining the need for the
new service. Therefore, "[b] y analogy, contract carriage may be
more 'economical' than common carriage by motor or rail within
the framework of the national transportation policy ....,,25
The Court continued the analogy by citing the Commission's own
decision 256 to the effect that a shipper's need for more economical
carriage would be considered if the existing carriers' rates were
so high as to be prohibitive. A DAB applicant thus could cite
this case as authority for the proposition that, if the service is
different, the rates are relevant factors in determining the ade251. Id. at 88, citing 49 U.S.C.A. § 303 (a) (15) (1959).
252. Id. at 90.
253. Id. at 89. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Harlan and
Stewart, dissented, Id. at 93, arguing that the Commission's discretion in
carrying out the policy of protecting common carriers made the presumption permissible.
254. Id. at 81.
255. Id. at 91.
256. Herman R. Ewell, Extension-Philadelphia, 72 M.C.C. 645 (1957).
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quacy of existing service and need for the new service. Moreover, this case, unlike Schaffer, rests on the national transportation policy to "promote... economical ... service," a provision
similar to that found in many state declarations of policy.257
Therefore, the two major objections to using the Schaffer argument on behalf of DAB-that DAB is not a separate "mode"
and that Schaffer rested on the "preserving inherent advantages"
language-have been substantially removed.
The judicial attack on the "adequacy" and "price-is-irrelevant" doctrines begun in Schaffer was pushed to the next logical
development by the Fourth Circuit in 1963 in a passenger carriage
case, Alexandria, Barcroft and Washington Transit Co. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission.25B The Transit
Commission, which began operations in 1961, was created by the
terms of a transit regulation compact entered into by Maryland,
Virginia and the District of Columbia. The Commission granted
a certificate of convenience and necessity to one Franklin to provide charter service to charitable and publicly supported groups
on the ground that the rates of existing charter carriers were so
high as to be generally out of reach of groups like the YMCA and
Little League. Franklin planned to keep his rates lower by using
inexpensive school bus-type vehicles.
The court's opinion, sustaining the grant of the certificate to
Franklin, is remarkable in several respects. First, the court demonstrated its sensitivity to the unique transportation problems
of urban areas, as compared to the essentially inter-city transportation dealt with by the ICC:
The creation of the Transit Commission was one of the
steps taken by Congress in the realization that regulation of
mass transit in a large metropolitan area requires solutions specifically tailored to the area's special needs. It is, therefore, to
be reasonably expected that the Transit Commission, in the exercise of its administrative functions, may establish regulations
and a body of law by case decisions that 259
will differ from those
'of public bodies regulating transportation.
Second, even though both the applicant and existing carriers
were charter services, so that both Schaffer and J-T Transport
were distinguishable, the court ruled that the rate differential
itself was so great "as to make the service proposed by the applicant a completely different one," citing by analogy the J-T
case.2 60 This argument would be very important to a DAB ap257.
258.
259.
260.

See statutes cited at note 249 supra.
323 F.2d 777 (4th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 779-80 (emphasis added).
Id. at 781.
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plicant attempting to overcome objections that the only useful
feature he could offer as against existing taxis would be a lower
price. Again analogous to a DAB situation, the court pointed out
that the competitive effect of the new certificate would be minor
since most of the applicant's traffic would be newly generated.
Finally, it is significant that the court reached this result in
spite of the fact that the terms of the transit compact were comparable to the most protective of state statutes providing that:
no certificate shall be issued to operate over the routes of any
holder of a certificate until it shall be proved ... that the service rendered by such certificate holder, over such route, is inadequate 26to the requirements of the public necessity and convenience. 1
4.

Recent Developments in ICC Attitudes Toward Distinctive
PassengerService and DAB-Like Operations

In D.C. Transit System, Inc. Extension-Limousine service
between Washington D.C. and New York, N.Y. 2 °2 the applicant
proposed to offer non-stop service for persons and their baggage
between National Airport in Washington and International Airport in New York. The seven-passenger limousines would offer
air conditioning, reclining seats, desk-type trays, telephones and
dictating machines. Division 1 of the ICC found that "[a]lthough the features which applicant would offer might be attractive to a limited portion of the traveling public, we are not
persuaded that they are so distinctive as to transform what is
essentially a regular-route, point-to-point operation into a new
and distinctive type of service. '263 Having assimilated the proposed operation to an ordinary bus service, the Commission
found that existing non-stop reserved-seat service between New
York and Washington (not the airports) was adequate and that
26
certification would jeopardize this existing service. '
It is useful to contrast the D.C. Transit case with a later applicatinn to provide a special service arising in 1964.265 The proposed operation involved non-scheduled, door-to-door, eight passenger limousine service between Worcester County, Massachusetts and race tracks and bingo games in New Hampshire and
261. Id.
262. 81 M.C.C. 737 (1959).
263. Id. at 744.
264. Strangely, the only authority cited by the Commission was the
Pan American case, where the application to provide special services
was granted. See text accompanying notes 208-12 supra.
265. Trailways of New England, Inc. v. United States, 235 F. Supp.
509 (D.D.C. 1964).
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Rhode Island. The opposing bus companies did not propose to
offer door-to-door service and their charter operations were performed only with large buses, making a trip carrying only eight
persons uneconomical. The Commission was sustained by the
district court in its grant of certification. The Commission's
grounds were that the new service was significantly different,
"necessarily involving a different rate structure," and that the
ability of the existing carriers to maintain their regular routes
26 6
would not be impaired.
The Commission's characterization notwithstanding, the new
operation in this case is no more "distinctive" than the new operation in D.C. Transit. Both cases turn on the Commission's judgment as to the seriousness of the impact on existing carriers. It
is certainly proper for this judgment to be the decisive factor
in either of these cases, but the Commission seems loath to rely
on it too heavily.
In a 1966 case involving a proposed operation more like DAB
than any other application we are aware of,2 67 the Commission
went too far in bolstering its decisions by characterizing different
service as not really different. The Arrow Line, Inc., proposed to
offer a door-to-door, non-stop passenger service from any point
in Hartford County, Connecticut, to any point in New York City.
Anyone who requested the service, presumably by telephone,
would be picked up by a seven-passenger limousine, with routing
and pickups scheduled to meet the patron's desires as closely as
possible.
In proceedings in which Greyhound and other regular-route
scheduled bus operators appeared in opposition, the Commission
denied the application, quoting the language from the D.C.
Transit case that although the features offered might be desirable to a portion of the public, "we are not persuaded that they
are so distinctive as to transform what is essentially a regularroute, point-to-point service into a new and specialized type of
2 608
motor carrier operation for which there is a public demand."
The district court reversed on appeal, ruling that the Commission's opinion was so ambiguous that the applicant was not
sufficiently informed of the reasons for the denial. The court
indicated uncertainty that the Commission had fulfilled its function of balancing the benefits of the new service against the com266. Id. at 513.

267. Arrow Line, Inc. v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn.
1966).

268. Id. at 610.
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petitive impact on existing service. In this connection the court,
citing Commission decisions, stated its view of the balancing
process:
[I]n resolving such conflicting considerations, there is, indeed,
leeway given the Commission. However, it has been the practice to emphasize the economic impact when the proposed features are closely approximated by existing services, and, on the
contrary, when the application does suggest a truly new and

desired concept to run
the risk of some loss of business to es269
tablished operations.
The court distinguished D.C. Transit not only on service characteristics but also on the ground that while the fare differential
in that case had been "modest," in the present case the $13-16
fare proposed by the applicant (as compared to $3.95 for an ordinary Hartford-New York bus trip) was "ostensibly not competitive with existing bus lines, even combined with taxi
fares.' 270 The court concluded that despite the Commission's
finding that the proposed operation was "essentially. . .an overthe-road service between major population centers," it had not
justified its apparent disregard of the distinctive service features
27 1
of the proposal.
On remand the certificate was granted, the Commission concluding that the service was distinctive, that a public need for it
had been shown and that existing service would not be significantly affected. 272 More importantly, however, the Commission
reaffirmed D.C. Transit, distinguishing it on the basis that while
the unscheduled, door-to-door, territorial service in this case was
truly "different" from ordinary bus service, the luxury limousine
service involved there, even though it apparently eliminated a
trip between the city and the airport on each end of the trip, was
not.
The standards set out by the court and the Commission's
opinion on remand in Arrow were reaffirmed in a case illustrating closely another possible application of the DAB concept-the
27
carpool-lease arrangement with customers doing the driving. 3
The proposed operation involved soliciting residents of northern
New Jersey desiring to commute to Manhattan, forming them
into groups and then "leasing" a nine-passenger limousine to the
group at a per person, per week rate. The applicant leasing com269. Id. at 611.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 612.
272. 103 M.C.C. 195 (1966).

273. Monarch Associates, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 107
M.C.C. 277 (1968).

19711

DIAL-A-BUS

pany furnished gasoline credit cards and commuter toll books,
filled vacancies in the group, picked up the vehicle periodically
for maintenance and insured the vehicle. The Commission ruled
that while the operation was not exempt from regulation as a
mere vehicle leasing operation, 74 the service was nevertheless
so distinctive and useful that a certificate should be granted. In
a litany of the claimed advantages of DAB, the Commission recognized the following beneficial and distinctive attributes of the
service:
reduction in commuter time of approximately one hour each
way;
door-to-door service;
weekly or monthly fare payment;
elimination of transfers;
no crowding;
assured seat;
fitness for handicapped persons unable to use conventional
mass transportation, and
flexibility in choosing least congested routes on a day-to-day
basis.
The Commission stated the applicable rule that "[wihere, as
here, the proposed service differs materially from that provided
by the mass transportation media in the area, the authority
sought has been granted."2 75 Significantly, the Commission concluded that public convenience and necessity required certification without any mention of either the comparative fare levels or
the economic impact on existing carriers. By focusing on a standard of material difference to the exclusion of competitive effects,
the Commission reached the opposite extreme from its analytical
approach in D.C. Transit.2 7 6 On principle, this is surely an oversimplification, for a "materially different" service could not be
certificated freely if the foreseeable result were that essential
fixed route mass transit service would be discontinued or could
operate only with an unacceptably high public subsidy.2 77 Such
274. For a discussion of this case in regard to issues of classification and exemption, see text accompanying notes 28 & 33 supra.
275. 107 MC.C. at 284.
276. Such an approach is reminiscent of that stated in West Shore
R.R. v. Board of Pub. Uti. Comm'rs, 13 N.J. Misc. 180, 182, 177 A. 93, 94
(Sup. Ct. 1935): "[I]f railroads 'are entitled as public utilities to protection against destructive competition, it should be a competition with a
service which they have been giving."'
277. But see Petersburg, Hopewell & City Point Ry. v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 152 Va. 193, 146 S.E. 292 (1929),
discussed in text accompanying notes 179-83 supra.
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a result would be at odds with the Commission's own avowed rule,
since Pan American Lines in 1936, to consider "whether...
[the] public purpose ... can be served by applicant with the new
operation or service proposed without endangering or impairing
the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public inter278
est.,
5.

Conclusion-Arguments for DAB from the Federal Regulatory Experience

In summary, a DAB applicant could urge the following propositions to a state department of public utilities or court on the
basis of federal authority in analogous situations:
(a) The ICC has recognized the beneficial and distinctive
features of DAB-type door-to-door service and in recent decisions has considered it to be entitled to a certificate, in one
instance without any consideration of the economic impact
on existing carriers (New England Trailways, Arrow Lines,
Monarch Associates).
(b) In any event, the effect on existing carriers is deemphasized where the new service is "materially different"
(Schaffer, J-T Transport,Alexandria,Arrow Lines).
(c) Whatever may be the standards of "differentness" required to bring the results of (a) and (b), a door-to-door
service such as DAB has consistently qualified under the
ICC "material difference" standard (New England Trailways,
Arrow Lines, Monarch Associates).
(d) Price differentials are relevant to the issues of public
need and present "adequacy" when the proposed service is
different (Schaffer, J-T Transport, Arrow Lines). Moreover, the fact of a price differential may be sufficient alone
to make a service "different" (Alexandria).
(e) The federal courts have recognized that the distinct
transit needs of urban areas justify rules and analytical approaches different from those developed by the ICC and state
regulatory bodies in typical intercity and over-the-road
transportation cases (Alexandria).

278.

Pan American Bus Lines Operation, 1 M.C.C. 190, 203 (1936).

